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ABSTRACT 
"THE PARENTS OF PROGRESSIVE IMPROVEMENT": RAILROADS AND 
PUBLIC POLICY IN KENTUCKY, 1829-1900. 
David Matthew Wilkins 
May 8,2004 
This thesis is a historical examination of the relationship between the railroad 
industry and state government in Kentucky during the nineteenth century. The thesis 
begins with an examination of the legal culture of the early nineteenth century and its 
relation to railroads. The thesis then shifts into an examination of the various political and 
social forces that led to regulation of railroads by 1900. 
The thesis is divided into five chapters. Chapter One covers the historiographical 
issues surrounding American railroad history, and introduces the reader to the topic. 
Chapter Two discusses early interactions between railroads and public policy in 
Kentucky, from 1829 to 1859. Chapter Three covers Louisville's fight against Cincinnati 
for southern trade supremacy in the years following the Civil War. Chapter Four 
explores the growing anti-railroad sentiment in Kentucky politics. Chapter Five 
concludes the thesis with a discussion of the interaction between railroads and public 
policy in the years following 1900. 
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PREFACE 
Writing in 1829, Chief Justice of the Kentucky Court of Appeals George 
Robertson touted railroads as, "The parents of progressive improvement." Writing the 
majority opinion in the case of Lexington and Ohio Rail Road v. Applegate and Others, 
Robertson upheld the right of the railroad to operate trains down the middle of Main 
Street in Louisville, Kentucky. Railroads, more than any other form of nineteenth 
century transportation, changed the way Americans lived, traveled, and conducted 
business. Railroads also altered the way in which many people viewed the relationship 
between business and government. 
In Kentucky the promotion of railroads at first enjoyed wide, popular support as 
well as resulted in great celebration. The Kentucky legislature chartered the new 
technology of railroads and granted the new companies special privileges and monopoly 
powers. Local governments used public monies to purchase stock and provide other 
financial and legislative support. Railroads for many people meant a new and promising 
future for Kentucky. 
In the years following 1865, popular and political perceptions of railroads 
changed. The general public grew concerned about the role of government in relation to 
big business. After the Civil War, most Kentucky railroads fell into the control of out of 
state investors. The immense political power of the L & N and other railroads in 
Kentucky created a sense of concern among farmers, politicians, and businessmen. For 
I 
the growing political agrarians and the dominant wing of the Democratic Party in 
Kentucky, railroads were something to fear and regulate. 
By the 1880s, railroad regulation replaced railroad promotion in public policy. 
On a state and federal level, railroad commissions, rate regulation, and labor issues 
became the political "hot button" issues of the day. Kentucky railroads countered 
attempts at regulation by flexing their political muscle. Continual political lobbying by 
railroads such as the L & N met with increased popular and political opposition to the 
industry. These groups called for greater regulation which in turn, resulted in greater 
lobbying by the railroads. The cycle continued until the 1900 governor's race ended in 
tragedy. While railroads were the parents of a progressive improvement in Kentucky, 
progressive improvement after the 1880s focused on regulation instead of promotion. 
The following thesis chronicles the transformation from promotion to regulation 
of railroads in Kentucky from 1829 to 1900. In order to tackle such a large subject a 
chronological approach with each chapter focusing on an important theme in the overall 
picture is presented. Chapter One covers the historiography of American railroad history 
and served as an introduction to the issue of railroads and public policy. 
Chapter Two chronicles the early court and legislative promotion of railroad 
projects in Kentucky from 1829 to 1850. An examination of the corporate charters of the 
Lexington and Ohio Rail Road and the Louisville and Nashville Railroads demonstrates 
the initial interaction between railroads and public policy. In addition to examining the 
charters of both railroads, other legal issues such as the important nuisance case of 
Lexington and Ohio Rail Road v. Applegate and Others receive attention. 
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Chapter Three shifts the focus to Louisville in the years following the Civil War. 
The chapter illustrates the important relationship between the L & N and the city of 
Louisville during those formative years. In addition, the chapter deals with some of the 
important political developments in Kentucky from 1865 to 1872. The city-railroad 
relationship and statewide political developments collided over the issue of southern 
identity, trade supremacy, and conflicting visions of the future of the South. 
Chapter Four examines the development of the L & N into an interstate railroad in 
the 1870s and 1880s. Crucial to the transformation is the transfer of ownership of the 
railroad from Louisville-based interests to foreign investors and financiers from New 
York City. The rise of political agrarianism occurred in this era. The protracted battle 
over state regulation of the industry continued until the 1899 election for governor. 
Chapter Five serves as the conclusion to the thesis. Summarizing the main points, 
the chapter also highlighted the political behavior of the L & N in Alabama and 
Tennessee after 1900 in order to demonstrate that the L & N's actions in Kentucky were 
not an anomaly. The issue of L & N involvement in the political process sparked a 
United States Senate investigation and a Supreme Court case in 1917. Both marked the 
close of an era in the political history of the L & N. 
The tendency for modem Americans to dislike big business and multi-state 
corporations traces its heritage to the formative years of the American railroad industry. 
No single party, the politicians, the railroad, or the public deserved singular blame for 
creating this popular image. Instead, as Kentucky's and America's first big business, 
railroads set a pattern for public policy in relation to business. It is from comprehending 
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these reactions that a better understanding ofthe history of the railroad-government 
relationship in the United States during the nineteenth century can be discovered. 
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CHAPTER ONE 
"PERNICIOUS PARTICIPATION": THE TRANSPORTATION REVOLUTION, 
RAILROADS, AND PUBLIC POLICY IN KENTUCKY. 
In 1939, Louisville historian Urey Woodson wrote of the political involvement of 
the Louisville and Nashville Railroad at its zenith, the 1899 gubernatorial election: 
[Milton] Smith thought the Louisville and Nashville Railroad's local attorneys 
would furnish money to candidates for seats in the General Assembly, sometimes 
impartially, but secretly, dividing this money between two men running from the 
same place. Thus he felt he couldn't loose. He took part in the election of judges 
as well as governors and other state offices, but always secretly until Goebel, who 
had long resented the Louisville and Nashville Railroad's pernicious participation 
in elections, became a candidate for Governor, and then Smith came out in the 
open to fight with all the ferocity of his nature the election of this man as the most 
dangerous enemy of his company, and backed by [August] Belmont and his board 
of directors in New York, he plunged into the campaign with such a lavish use of 
money as was never witnessed before or since in Kentucky. 1 
The bitter fight of the 1899 election of Kentucky's governor capped off nearly a half 
century of political involvement in Kentucky by the Louisville and Nashville Railroad. 
Throughout its existence, the Louisville and Nashville Railroad became a formidable 
political force in Kentucky and throughout the South. When the company fell into 
control of New York Stockholders in 1881, the L & N achieved a new level of political 
and financial clout. The election in 1899, however, brought an end to active and public 
political involvement of the railroad? In the attempt to defeat Goebel, the L & N may 
have gone too far and played its hand out. Either way, the railroad never wielded the 
I Urey Woodson, The First New Dealer: William Goebel, His Origin, Ambitions, Achievements, His 
Assassination, Loss to the State and Nation, The Story ofa Great Crime (Louisville, KY.: Standard Printing 
Company, 1939), 179. 
2 Maury Klein, The History of the Louisville and Nashville Railroad (New York: Macmillan, 1972),392. 
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same political power it had before the election. Much of the political fighting that 
occurred in Kentucky as a result of railroad regulation and growth was a direct outgrowth 
of the political environment that citizens of Kentucky found themselves in following the 
Civil War. 
In 1861, Kentucky lay in between two warring sections of the country. The war 
brought Union occupation and attempted secession by some counties in the far western 
comer of the state. April 1865 may have brought the end ofthe war; however, the war's 
remnants lasted for many decades. Central to the political battles in Kentucky following 
the Civil War was a business institution that legislators, citizens, and others once greeted 
with enthusiasm, but later perceived as an oppressive business monopoly.3 By 1865 the 
railroad had existed in Kentucky for less than thirty years.4 The largest railroad in the 
state, the Louisville and Nashville Railroad received its charter from the Kentucky 
General Assembly on March 5, 1850 to construct a line between the two cities.5 After 
years of delay, the railroad operated its first regularly scheduled trains between Louisville 
and Nashville on October 31, 1859.6 From the start, the railroad became a prosperous 
commercial artery, connecting Louisville with the South. The L & N, unlike other 
southern railroads, prospered throughout the war and escaped serious damage.7 
Emerging from the war unscathed, the L & N proceeded on a strategy of dominating both 
southern commerce and the regional transpiration industry. Part of the post-war business 
strategy centered on direct involvement in the political process. The involvement by 
3 Ibid., 386. 
4 Leonard P. Curry, Rail Routes South: Louisville's Fight/or the Southern Market, 1865-1872 (Lexington: 
University of Kentucky Press, 1969), 12-14. 
5 Klein, 6-9. 
6 Curry, 18. 
7 John F. Stover, The Railroads o/the South, 1865-1900: A Study in Finance and Control (Chapel Hill: 
University of North Carolina Press, 1955),210-212. 
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railroads, such as the L & N, in Kentucky politics became a major issue during the 
period. By the early 1870s it became clear to company shareholders that the L & N was 
in a constant battle for the protection of its corporate interests. Kentucky railroads, 
specifically the L & N found itself in the unenviable position of being somewhat disliked 
by all sides of the political spectrum. The resulting political, legal, and business disputes 
of the era created a negative public image for the railroad, an image that never vanished 
from the public view. In addition, the L & N's involvement in politics allowed an anti-
big business attitude to ferment in Kentucky, an attitude that permeated state politics for 
decades after the initial political battles. 
Kentucky was not alone in its struggle to reconcile the often conflicting goals of 
business promotion and the protection of the public interest. Throughout the United 
States, the railroad brought change and progress at a rapid rate. The availably of fast, 
relatively inexpensive transportation changed the market for crops and livestock, and how 
businesses manufactured and sold goods. The railroad industry itself became the 
country's first big business. The immense physical complexities of constructing, 
maintaining, and operating even the most minor railroad route required advances in labor, 
technology, the law, politics, banking and finance. 8 While generally accepted as a 
positive aspect of progress, railroads soon became perceived by the public as a problem. 
The eras of Reconstruction, the Gilded Age, and the Progressive Era often centered on 
the companies and personalities associated with the railroad industry. Jay Gould, 
Cornelius Vanderbilt, Edward Harriman, Austin Corbin, Leland Stanford, James J. Hill, 
William Marsh Rice, Collis P. Huntington, Henry Flagler, August Belmont were names 
8 Stephen Salsbury, The State, the Investor, and the Railroad: The Boston and Albany, 1825-1867 
(Cambridge, MA.: Harvard University Press, 1967),6. 
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the public soon associated with lavish expenditures and destruction of the public trust. 9 
While Milton H. Smith, president of the L & N, was not a "robber baron" in the 
traditional sense, he did attract much of the same criticism as other railroad presidents 
and owners of the era. 10 National trends in railroad law and railroads' political 
involvement remain an important aspect oflate nineteenth and early twentieth century 
American history and continue to receive attention by scholars. On a smaller scale, the 
history of railroad's political involvement on the state level needs to be revisited in order 
to gain a more complete picture of the industry. 
The first major set of works dealt with the impact of railroads in national terms. 
In the field of transportation history, two works dating from the mid-1950s continue to 
influence the field of transportation and economic history. George Rogers Taylor, in his 
classic 1951 book, The Transportation Revolution, 1815-1860, charted the rapid growth 
in transportation systems that developed in the rapidly expanding republic. I I Taylor 
fashioned his explanation for the rise of railroads into evolutionary terms.12 Turnpikes, 
plank roads, canals, and inland river boats all played an evolutionary role in the 
development of the transportation wonder of the nineteenth century, the railroad. As 
9 August Belmont, famous for Belmont Park, the Belmont Hotel, was also a noted railroad financier. He 
became the person who financially backed the L & N after the City of Louisville sold most of its stock in 
the 1880s. Belmont also attained importance for being the American representative of the Rothschild bank, 
and as the main backer of the Interborough Rapid Transportation Company, the first New York Subway in 
1904. Belmont owned the world's first and only private subway car, which according to legend could take 
Belmont directly from the basement of the Belmont hotel to a special platform at Belmont Park racecourse 
on the Long Island Railroad. 
10 The long shadow of the legend of the robber barons still permeates railroad history literature. William Z. 
Ripley, Railroads: Finance and Organization (New York: Longmans, 1915). Ripley, the Ropes Professor 
of economics at Harvard remained the authority on railroad business practice until George Keenan, an 
amateur historian found Ropes' work on the subject to be woefully inadequate. Matthew Josephson, The 
Robber Barons: The Great American Capitalists. 1861-1901 (New York: Harcourt Brace, 1934), still 
influences the historiography of American railroads. 
11 George Rogers Taylor, The Transportation Revolution. 1815-1860 (New York: Rinehart, 1951). 
12 With the exception of riverboats and turnpikes, Kentucky missed the evolutionary step of canals. The 
topography and immense capital investment required limited Kentucky to just one canal, the Louisville and 
Portland Canal designed to allow transshipment of freight and passengers over the falls of the Ohio River. 
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important as Taylor's book was, it contained some problems. The main criticism of The 
Transportation Revolution centered on Taylor's teleological approach to transportation 
history, portraying the process as a natural one, with little resistance from rival 
technologies. To correct this problem and refine his thesis, Taylor, along with Irene D. 
Neu, coauthored a book five years later, The American Railroad Network, 1861-1890 
(1956).13 In this book, Taylor and Neu admitted that early railroad maps of the United 
States left an inaccurate impression. Gauge differences prevented the creation of a true 
American railroad network, a problem that gave much difficulty to the Confederacy 
during the Civil War.14 Taylor demonstrated how market forces and cooperation helped 
the railroad industry to standardize railroad gauge and safety devices by the late 1880s so 
that a car of freight would not have to break bulk in a journey from Boston to San 
Francisco. IS Overall, Taylor presented a coherent picture of the technological problems 
American railroads faced in the period after the Civil War. 
Another historian who tackled the many technological problems of the American 
railroad, John H. White, originally began his work in preparation for an exhibit at the 
Smithsonian. White, originally commissioned by the Smithsonian to work on a history of 
American railroad technology, spent nearly thirty years combing archives. What resulted 
were three important additions to the field of railroad history. White's first book, 
American Locomotives: An Engineering History (1968), moved beyond typical buff-
\3 George Rogers Taylor, and Irene D. Neu, The American Railroad Network, 1861-1890 (Cambridge, 
MA.: Harvard University Press, 1956). 
14 For a general history of Civil War railroading see Robert Black, The Railroads of the Confederacy 
(Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1952). A newer study of how railroads helped and 
hindered armies in battle, see Roger Pickenpaugh, Rescue by Rail: Troop Transfer and the Civil War in the 
West, 1863 (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1998). 
15 Breaking bulk often referred to the moving and unpacking of freight on its journey. Before the 1880s, 
many railroads did not interchange. For example, trains traveling through Pittsburgh had to be unloaded, 
transported across the city on wagons, and reloaded onto other freight cars. Places where gauge changed, 
such as Louisville also required the inefficient transfer of freight. 
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based books on the subject and into a more scholarly setting. 16 Using a variety of 
historical methods, White uncovered important insights on manufacturing techniques and 
other information that shed light on the state of railroad technology throughout the 
nineteenth century. 
His two follow-up books, titled The American Railroad Passenger Car (1978) 
and The American Railroad Freight Car (1981) further tackled the development of 
technology in nineteenth-century America. 17 Railroading for both passengers and 
employees became a dangerous activity in the nineteenth century. White charted the 
development of safer all-steel passenger cars, and the invention of safety devices such as 
the automatic coupler and air brakes. 
In addition to works on transportation and economic history, general American 
railroad history need be examined. Noted railroad historian Maury Klein once lamented 
at the lack of a good, scholarly, general history of American railroads. The best book in 
the field, John Stover's American Railroads, first was published in 1961.18 Perhaps 
because of the difficulty in condensing the topic of American railroad history into a 
manageable size, few authors have attempted to better the work of Stover. Albro Martin 
in his book, Railroads Triumphant (1992), demonstrated the difficulty in separating his 
genuine love for the railroad from his attempt at a scholarly account ofthe rise and fall of 
America's first powerful industry.19 Since the works of Stover and Martin, several 
specialized studies of the American railroad have been published. One of the most 
16 John H. White, American Locomotives: An Engineering History (Baltimore, MD.: Johns Hopkins 
University Press, 1968). 
17 John H. White, The American Railroad Passenger Car (Baltimore, MD.: Johns Hopkins University 
Press, 1978) and John H. White, The American Railroad Freight Car: From the Wood Car Era to the 
Coming of Steel (Baltimore, MD.: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1981). 
18 John F. Stover, American Railroads (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1961). 
19 Albro Martin, Railroads Triumphant: The Growth, Rejection, and Rebirth of a Vital American Force 
(New York: Oxford University Press, 1992). 
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important of these new works, Sarah Gordon's book, Passage to Union: How the 
Railroads Transformed American Life, 1829-1929 (1996), examined the impact of the 
railroad in the United States. Gordon focused on the cultural, social, and legal issues that 
resulted from railroad expansion.2o Gordon further exhibited the large impact railroad 
exerted on America. 
Historian Walter Licht explained the role that railroad labor played in American 
life with his book titled, Working for the Railroad: The Organization of Work in the 
Nineteenth Century (1983).21 Licht chose to focus his study on the first two generations 
of American railroad workers in the period from 1830 to 1877. Until Licht's book, most 
scholars began any study of American railway labor with the Great Strike of 1877. Licht, 
however, decided to examine the development of work in the railroad industry. The 
development of such a large industry with many skilled jobs required some sort of 
organization. Licht analyzed the development of the railway crafts during this period in 
relation to other American fields,z2 
American railroads also transformed the economic landscape of the country. The 
first author to examine the impact of the railroad industry on American economic life was 
Alfred DuPont Chandler. Chandler, a noted economic historian, first began to compile 
his thesis of the managerial revolution in his book, Railroads: The Nation's First Big 
Business (1969).23 This book was a compilation of primary sources that provided the 
genesis of Chandler's thought into the development of middle management in American 
20 Sarah Gordon, Passage to Union: How the Railroads Transformed American Life, 1829-1929 (Chicago: 
Ivan R. Dee, 1996). 
21 Walter Licht, Workingfor the Railroad: The Organization of Work in the Nineteenth Century (Princeton, 
NJ.: Princeton University Press, 1983) 
22 For a study of how the Louisville and Nashville Railroad developed its shop forces into an efficient 
organization, see John H. White, "Thatcher Perkins: Master of Machinery," Railroad History 13 (1992): 
10-14. 
23 Alfred DuPont Chandler, The Railroads: The Nation's First Big Business (New York: Arno Press, 1969). 
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business. Chandler's most famous and important work was his book titled, The Visible 
Hand: The Managerial Revolution in American Business (1977).24 While the book 
focused on other industries, Chandler credited the railroad industry with introducing the 
need for an organized business structure in America. Before the coming of railroads, 
business remained small with the owners conducting most of the management. The 
complexity brought on by the sheer size of railroads forced American businesses to 
rethink their strategies. Railroads needed organized, efficient operation, to avoid a 
breakdown in communication or organizational structure. 
American business and economic development often resulted because of the help 
of state courts and state legislatures. An example of how the role of government 
transformed from being the promoter to the regulator of industry, two books by James 
Willard Hurst, stand as important works in business and legal history. Hurst's first book, 
Law and Economic Growth: The Legal History of the Lumber Industry in Wisconsin, 
1836-1915 (1964), chronicled how the lumber industry was originally the target of 
promotion by state courts and legislatures.25 Wisconsin, as one of the birthplaces of 
progressivism, slowly engaged in a series of legislative measures which regulated the 
lumber industry. The main point of Hurst's work was that the relationship between 
business and government changed significantly throughout the nineteenth century. 
Hurst's other work on the subject, Law and Markets in United States History: Different 
Modes of Bargaining Among Interests (1982) expanded on his earlier thesis to include the 
24 Alfred DuPont Chandler, The Visible Hand: The Managerial Revolution in American Business 
(Cambridge, MA.: Belknap Press, 1977). Chandler's work on the managerial revolution still attracts 
reaction by scholars. For a recent argument against the managerial revolution, see Naomi R. Lamoreaux, 
Daniel M. G. Raff, and Peter Temin, "Beyond Markets and Hierarchies: Toward a New Synthesis of 
American Business History," American Historical Review 108 (April 2003): 404-433. 
25 James Willard Hurst, Law and Economic Growth: The Legal History of the Lumber Industry in 
Wisconsin, 1836-1915 (Cambridge, MA.: Belknap Press, 1964). 
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entire country.26 While not specific to railroads, Hurst's work highlighted the intricacies 
ofbusiness-govemmental relationships. 
While none of the above works focused specifically on the Louisville and 
Nashville Railroad or railroad development in Kentucky, an understanding of the national 
trends is necessary in order to place the railroad-political conflict into perspective. 
Another area of important literature necessary to understanding railroad development 
centered on the legal development of railroads. The most significant recent work dealing 
with the impact of railroads on American legal history came from noted legal historian 
James Ely. His book, Railroads and American Law (2001), focused on the development 
oflegal doctrine as a result of the introduction of the railroad into American life.27 Ely 
focused the book on the nineteenth century, when a majority of legal development 
pertaining to railroads occurred. The main thesis of Ely's book centered on how 
legislative and legal doctrines often were inadequate to meet the demands of a changing 
economy. Railroads, Ely stated, suffered from the beginning because of an inadequate 
legal framework that kept in mind the demands of the industry. Compounded by a 
misunderstanding of the industry's intentions, the situation created an unfavorable 
political and legal climate for the industry by the end of the nineteenth century. Ely's 
work was important because it moved beyond the "Robber Baron" image of the 
American railroad industry in the late nineteenth century to a more complicated and less 
general concept of why the railroad industry ultimately failed to gain public, political, 
and legal support at a crucial time in its development. 
26 James Willard Hurst, Law and Markets in United States History: Different Modes of Bargaining Among 
Interests (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1982). 
27 James Ely, Railroads and American Law (Lawrence: University of Kansas Press, 2001). 
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Of the three major recent works on railroad law, Railroads and American Law 
remains the most important to the fields of railroad and legal history. Ely's work served 
as a vehicle to rethink the field of railroad legal history. From an evaluation of the 
breadth and width of the field of railroad legal history, Ely pointed out problems of 
interpretation and coverage of issues. In parts of the work, Ely challenged traditional 
notions of railroad history from what Ely perceived as the myth of the robber barons. 
A different and more regionalized approach to railroad legal history was the 
method that William G. Thomas used in his book, Lawyeringfor the Railroad: Business, 
Law, and Power in the New South (1999).28 Thomas demonstrated the expansive 
influence of the railroad industry in the post Civil War South. The railroad legal structure 
trickled down to local attorneys in small towns who worked for railroad companies on 
retainer.29 The growth in complexity of the railroad industry required the rethinking of 
the local strategy and the organization of professional, in-house legal departments. More 
than just a history of railroad law, Thomas used the growth of railroads to explain the 
growth of the legal industry in the South. The problem with Thomas' work was that it 
focused on too many side issues to present an effective thesis. Still important for the 
primary source research, Lawyering for the Railroad, remains important to the 
scholarship of railroad law in the nineteenth century. 
Another book that examined the railroad in a legal perspective, Barbara Welke's 
Recasting American Liberty: Race, Gender, Law, and the Railroad Revolution (2001), 
focused on the societal and cultural issues that surrounded the introduction of rail travel 
28William G. Thomas, Lawyeringfor the Railroad: Business, Law, and Power in the New South (Baton 
Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1999). 
29 Ibid., 47-50. 
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in the United States.30 Welke used railroads as a way to demonstrate her thesis of 
technology driving social and cultural change. While the author did not focus on legal 
issues such as contracts, property, and other areas normally associated with railroad law, 
Welke examined the broader social impact of improved transportation and what it meant 
for America in the long term. The railroad, in Welke's thesis, redefined liberty as an 
individual right for Americans, a right still in practice today. 
Ely, Thomas, and Welke all pointed out that any study of railroad law meant more 
than charting change in legal doctrine or court cases. Equally important in the legal 
process for the railroads was participation in the political process. For railroads and other 
industries ofthe era, political process and the legal process were one and the same issue. 
In order to protect their business interests, railroads resorted to lobbying and campaigning 
on issues and for candidates that benefited the railroad industry as a whole. Much of the 
image of corruption and exhortation by railroads could be viewed in the light of an 
industry protecting its property and business interests through political means. 
Railroad legal history aside, the final issue that must be consulted in terms of 
national trends in the American railroad industry was railroad capitalization and 
development.31 One of the first regional studies of the subject came from John F. Stover 
in his book titled, Railroads of the South, 1865-1900: A Study in Finance and Control 
(1955).32 While considered old by contemporary standards, Stover argued that the end of 
the Civil War brought an important financial change to Southern railroads. Before the 
30 Barbara Y. Welke, Recasting American Liberty: Race, Gender, Law, and the Railroad Revolution (New 
York: Oxford University Press, 2001). 
31 For a study of European railroad capitalization see Sybil Jack and Adrian Jack, "Nineteenth-Century 
Lawyers and Railway Capitalism," The Journal of Legal History 24 (April 2003): 59-85. 
32 John F. Stover, Railroads of the South 1865-1900: A Study in Finance and Control (Chapel Hill: 
University of North Carolina Press, 1955). 
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war, local interests funded Southern railroad construction. Unlike the North, the South 
tended to use direct state and local financial aid, even outright government ownership in 
order to finance railroad construction.33 The virtual destruction of the railroad network in 
the South following the Civil War ended any hopes of continued local control in terms or 
railroad ownership. The major sources of capital investment were in the North and in 
Europe. Reliance on these outside sources of income caused some political friction in the 
South but was necessary in order to help rebuild the Southern economy. Stover finished 
his study by demonstrating that even outside and foreign ownership still allowed for local 
control in the form of management to preside over railroads of the South.34 While not the 
same as the Antebellum years, the attraction of outside capital helped restore and expand 
the Southern railroad network. 
Another important contemporary work that dealt with the issue of railway 
capitalization European, Capital, British Iron, and American Dreams: The Story o/the 
Atlantic and Great Western Railroad (2002) by William Reynolds.35 Originally written 
in the late nineteenth century but only recently rediscovered, Reynolds' work explained 
the sometimes difficult relationships between railroad investors and those who operated 
and built the lines. The book serves as an important document into the complexities of 
railroad finance and construction in the nineteenth century. 
Moving into more specific literature, a good number of works exist that relate to 
the construction and operation of the Louisville and Nashville Railroad. The best of the 
33 The L & N remained an exception. Unlike other railroads in the South, no official, direct state aid was 
used to construct the line. Instead, the L & N relied on local aid in the form of stock and bond purchases. 
The city of Louisville controlled a large block of stock in the railroad until the 1880s. 
34 Even after purchase by the New York syndicate headed by August Belmont and Austin Corbin, Milton 
Smith and Basil Duke remained relatively free to operate the L & N as they saw fit. 
35 William Reynolds, European Capital, British Iron, and American Dreams: The Story of the Atlantic and 
Great Western Railroad, eds. Peter K. Gifford, and Robert D. Llisevich (Akron, OR.: University of Akron 
Press, 2002). 
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general histories of the railroad, The History of the Louisville and Nashville Railroad 
(1972) by Maury Klein, remains an important contribution to railroad historical 
scholarship. Klien, commissioned by Macmillan Publishing in the late 1960s, spent 
considerable time and effort researching the L & N's past relying official company 
records. Klein chose to focus the majority of the book on the nineteenth century, the 
period when the L & N experienced most of its initial and important development.36 In 
addition, the nineteenth century was a time when the L & N was most active in Kentucky 
politics. Klein devoted an entire chapter to the L & N' role in state politics in Alabama 
and Kentucky. Not as well written or researched was Kincaid Herr's history ofthe L & 
N titled The Louisville and Nashville Railroad, 1850-1963 (1963), focused on the 
positive aspects of the railroad's history.37 Kerr, an employee ofthe L & N's public 
relations department and frequent contributor to the company magazine, authored his 
history of the L & N in the late 1930s and updated it to its 1963 final edition. While 
somewhat interesting, L & N sponsored the writing and publication of Herr's history and 
thus some of the negative aspects of the railroad's history received little or no attention 
by the author. 
Of special interest to those interested in the history of the L & N, Edward Hines' 
1905 book titled, Corporate History of the Louisville and Nashville Railroad, provided a 
different view of the early history of the railroad.38 Literally a corporate history, the book 
covered the construction of the original railroad and the incorporation, merger or 
36 For a reissue of Klein's book on the L & N see Maury Klein, History of the Louisville and Nashville 
Railroad (Lexington: University Press of Kentucky, 2002). 
37 Kincaid A. Herr, The Louisville and Nashville Railroad, 1850-1963 (Louisville, KY.: Louisville and 
Nashville Railroad Company, 1963). 
38 Edward Hines, Corporate History of the Louisville and Nashville Railroad (Louisville, KY.: Standard 
Printing Company, 1905). 
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acquisition of other subsidiary railroads throughout the company's first fifty years of 
operation. 
One of the largest political battles the L & N entangled itself in was the fight 
against the chartering ofthe Cincinnati Southern Railroad. After the Civil War, 
Louisville held a monopoly on direct rail routes to the Deep South. The city of 
Cincinnati challenged this monopoly by trying to build a railroad to Chattanooga. 
Several good books focused on this important struggle for trade and business supremacy. 
The only book, however, that focused on the Louisville aspects of the Cincinnati 
Southern story was Leonard Curry's book, Rail Routes South: Louisville's Fight for the 
Southern Market, 1865-1872 (1969). Curry used primary sources and presented the 
Louisville side of the fight. Louisville, through the L & N, protected its position as a 
leading trade center for the South by lobbying the Kentucky General Assembly.39 The L 
& N's efforts paid offtwice before Cincinnati won out. Curry did an excellent job of 
highlighting the political implications of Louisville's domination of the Southern market, 
especially how those implications led to an overall distrust and dislike of Louisville and 
the Louisville and Nashville Railroad. 
The L & N's role in Kentucky politics took place in a time of great political 
transition in Kentucky. To understand the public policy reaction both for and against 
railroads in Kentucky, it is necessary to comprehend the political forces at work. James 
Klotter and Hambleton Tapp wrote of the era in their book, Kentucky: Decades of 
39 For the Cincinnati viewpoint of the battle for the Cincinnati Southern see Charles Gilbert Hall, The 
Cincinnati Southern Railway: A History, (Cincinnati, OH.: The McDonald Press, 1902); Edward A. 
Ferguson, Founding of the Cincinnati Southern Railway: With an Autobiographical Sketch (Cincinnati, 
OH.: The R. Clarke Co., 1905). 
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Discord, 1865-1900 (1977).40 Klotter and Tapp relied on the standard historiographical 
version of Kentucky politics of the era. The Kentucky Democratic Party, coming out of 
the Civil War, split into two large factions. The first faction, the "New Democrats," 
championed by newspaper editor Henry Watterson, wished to move the party beyond the 
shadow of the war, and into modem America. Furthermore, the "New Democrats" 
wanted to modernize Kentucky, to "out Yankee the Yankee." On the other side, the 
traditional element of the Democratic Party, the "Bourbons," or old Democrats wanted 
Kentucky to remain largely the same as it was before the Civil War. Whether a candidate 
served with the Confederacy remained a major issue with this faction of the party. As the 
latter half of the nineteenth century progressed, the fracture between the two competing 
factions increased. 
A differing appraisal of Kentucky post-war politics appeared in an article 
authored by Thomas L. Connelly, "Neo-Confederates or Power Vacuum: Post War 
Kentucky Politics Appraised" that appeared in the Register of the Kentucky Historical 
Society.41 In the article, Connelly took to task the standard interpretation; arguing that 
until 1880, Neo-Confederates, who eventually surrendered to the "New Departure" or 
"New Democrats," dominated Kentucky politics. Instead, Connelly argued that the 
political landscape of Kentucky after the Civil War resembled sectional power politics. 
A national party structure did not exist in Kentucky. Instead, financial and regional needs 
forged sectional political parties that controlled the state political structure. 
40 James C. Klotter and Hambleton Tapp, Kentucky: Decades o/Discord, 1865-1900 (Frankfort, KY.: 
Kentucky Historical Society, 1977). 
41 Thomas L. Connelly, "Neo-Confederatism or Power Vacuum: Post War Kentucky Politics Reappraised," 
The Register o/the Kentucky Historical Society 64 (October 1966): 257-269. 
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William Goebel, the most prominent figure in post Civil War Kentucky politics, 
became entangled in railroad politics from his earliest days in the Kentucky General 
Assembly. Several authors have tackled the rise and sudden fall of William Goebel in the 
Kentucky political scene. Goebel, the most divisive politician in Kentucky in the 
nineteenth century represented the political split in the Democratic Party. Numerous 
works have been written about Goebel and his involvement in railroad politics, and his 
desire for state control of freight rates. Still, most of the historiography on Goebel 
portrayed the politician as something he was not. One of the most blatant efforts to 
posthumously elevate William Goebel was Urey Woodson's book, The First New Dealer 
(1939). Written in the 1930s, Woodson placed Goebel into the political sensibilities of 
the era. By calling him "The First New Dealer," Woodson ignored the specific political, 
cultural, and social environment that led William Goebel to declare his political war 
against the Louisville and Nashville Railroad. More of an endorsement of the Roosevelt 
Administration's programs of economic recovery, Woodson's book suffered from an 
inaccurate interpretation, designed more to lionize rather than depict Goebel. A better 
biography of Goebel, authored by noted Kentucky historian James Klotter, William 
Goebel: The Politics of Wrath, placed Goebel and his policies into a role where the 
Kentucky politician resembled Huey Long of Louisiana. While not a perfect 
interpretation, Klotter also stated that Goebel was a product of the tumultuous political 
troubles of the time. Goebel, a politician who united a divided, faltering Democratic 
Party, ended up causing further political strife in Kentucky because of his very actions. 
The final major category of secondary literature transcends many of the categories 
above. Railroad freight regulation became a contested public policy issue of the latter 
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half ofthe nineteenth century. No other single issue garnered as much emotional feelings 
both for and against the railroad industry. Lee Dew authored a number of articles about 
localities fighting against what they perceived as discriminatory freight rates throughout 
the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries.42 While enlightening in regard to the 
local politics of railroad freight regulation, his articles present one problem. Dew wrote 
them using the mode of the "robber baron" railroads stealing money from poor farmers. 
The method Dew used failed to examine the reasons behind high short hall freight costs 
for the railroad. 
A review of the extensive secondary literature reveals that few historians viewed 
the railroad-political relationship in Kentucky as a singular subject for study. With the 
one exception of a single chapter in Klein's history of the L & N, no other authors looked 
at railroad public policy in Kentucky in a larger context. The numerous works on the 
Cincinnati Southern battle and freight rates only highlighted single issues. In order to 
understand the full impact of railroads on business law and the political structure in 
Kentucky following the Civil War, a new approach is needed. William Thomas in 
Lawyeringfor the Railroad, demonstrated that such an approach worked because of the 
extensive primary sources available to a researcher. 
In addition to the dearth of historical writing on the issue of Kentucky railroad 
politics of the era, the literature suffered another problem. Most Kentucky history, and 
by default Kentucky political, social, business, and economic history, followed the 
42 Lee A. Dew, "The Tennessee Sugar Rate Cases," Tennessee Historical Quarterly 41 (March 1982): 171-
182; Lee A. Dew, "Owensboro's Dream to Glory, A Railroad to Russellville," Filson Club History 
Quarterly 52 (January 1978): 26-45: Lee A. Dew, "Henderson, Kentucky, and the Fight for Equitable 
Freight Rates," Register of the Kentucky His'torical Society 76 (January 1978): 34-44; Lee A. Dew, "The 
Owensboro Cattle Cases: A Study in Commerce Regulation," Filson Club History Quarterly 49 (March 
1975): 195-203, 
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tendency to ignore the national events of the period. In other words, many historians who 
wrote of events in Kentucky gave the perception that that the state lived in a political 
vacuum, impervious to national political, social, business, and economic trends. The 
result of the blinded approach has caused few historians to make the connections between 
Kentucky and contemporary national events. In an era that was marked by the Goebel 
assassination and the Hatfield-McCoy feud, Kentucky appeared as an anomaly in the 
national spotlight. This tendency to view Kentucky as somehow different from the rest 
of the country still permeated historical writing to the present era. In fact, the events 
surrounding a growing discomfort with the political and legal power of the Louisville and 
Nashville Railroad mirrored a rethinking of the industry nationwide. Throughout the last 
half of the nineteenth century, social crusaders, progressives, and others rallied against 
what they viewed as an unforgiving corporate monopoly whose goal was to enslave the 
farmers and merchants of America in exchange for a profit. Therefore, the current 
historiography of Kentucky railroad politics contains a gap. 
The historiographical gap, of railroad political interaction in Kentucky, is 
significant. Historians tended to treat the issue as a side show of a much larger spectacle 
of political and social realignment after the Civil War. In order to examine the political 
involvement of the Louisville and Nashville Railroad, primary materials, written by those 
who participated in the events that shaped Kentucky'S political, legal, and business 
environment must be consulted. 
The first and most numerous examples of primary documents relevant to the topic 
are the mUltiple daily and weekly newspapers in Kentucky. Louisville, the Kentucky'S 
largest city, served as the chief battleground for the issue of railroad political involvement 
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in Kentucky. Henry Watterson, the editor of The Louisville Courier-Journal made a 
considerable impact in Kentucky politics.43 A champion of the Democratic Party, 
especially the "New Democrats" faction that tried to heal the political wounds of the 
Civil War, Watterson used his newspaper as a vehicle to support his political beliefs. For 
the historian, Watterson's prose provided an excellent window into the period. However, 
one should note that Watterson's Courier-Journal was highly partisan, and other sources 
are needed in order to bolster any factual conclusion that may yield from the newspaper. 
Counterbalancing the views of The Louisville Courier-Journal, The Louisville 
Commercial newspaper, presented a pro-business viewpoint. Originally formed during 
the Civil War by Unionists, The Louisville Commercial attracted some attention. While 
not as prominent or as long-lasting at the Watterson newspaper, the paper provided 
insights into some of the pro-merchant, pro-business attitudes of the period. In addition 
to The Louisville Commercial, other minor newspapers throughout the state provide a 
good window into the political passions of the era. 
William Thomas in his book titled, Lawyering for the Railroad, proved the value 
of railroad company records in historical research. The use of such records allowed 
Thomas to create an interesting history of the railroad legal profession in the South 
following the Civil War. One source of records that Thomas used were the Louisville 
and Nashville Railroad Company records. These records, housed at the University of 
Louisville, constitute one of the largest archival collections in the state. While Thomas 
was unable to find specific law department records, he used the plethora of executive 
correspondence and other material. 
43 For a biography of Henry Watterson, see Joseph Frazier Wall, Henry Watterson: A Reconstructed Rebel 
(Louisville, KY.: The Standard Printing Company, 1951); for Watterson's autobiography see Henry 
Watterson, Marse Henry: An Autobiography (New York: Beekman, 1974) 
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In summary, scholarship of the railroad industry in the United States is 
experiencing a resurgence in scholarly interest. New approaches by historians such as 
Sarah Gordon and James Ely tied railroads to cultural, social, and legal history in order to 
illustrate how the industry effected broad impacts in American society. The continued 
interest in railroad will foster new, and better revisions to the classic theses of historians 
like Chandler, Taylor, and White. Still, one area that is largely ignored, even in this new 
era of railroad scholarship, centers on the relationship between railroads and public 
policy. Such a study, if ever conducted on a national scale, would provide important 
insight into the deep impact of the railroad on everyday political and social life in the 
United States. Until that work is written, historians must first concentrate on the railroad-
political relationship on a smaller scale. 
Because a historiographical gap exists in regard to Kentucky railroad public 
policy of the late nineteenth century, a new approach to railroad history is called for. The 
multitude of secondary material, including excellent monographs on the various aspects 
of railroad, economic, business, political, and Kentucky history, should not be ignored. 
In addition, the availability of good primary sources serves as a foundation for any 
interpretation of the topic. The underlying significance of any study of business politics 
in Kentucky following the Civil War is to gain a greater understanding of the political, 
legal, cultural, and social atmosphere of the time. Railroads provided the first 
opportunity for the wide scale opposition to big business in America. The railroad 
changed Kentucky. That change presented itself in ways other than better transportation. 
The introduction of a highly-organized, capital intensive business into the 
Commonwealth created many opportunities for change and advancement among those 
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who lived in the state. The railroad also brought conflict to the region. When the 
railroad conflicted with the priorities, values, and beliefs of Kentuckians, they took their 
disputes into the court rooms and to the General Assembly. The utilization of public 
policy to settle railroad conflicts in Kentucky eventually helped create an anti-business 
attitude among progressive reformers and traditional Democrats. The transformation of 
railroad public policy from promotion to regulation began with the appearance of the new 
form of transportation in Kentucky in 1829. 
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CHAPTER TWO 
"THE ONWARD SPIRIT OF THE AGE": EARLY RAILROADS AND PUBLIC 
POLICY IN KENTUCKY, 1829-1859. 
On June 19, 1839, the Kentucky Court of Appeals settled an important legal 
question regarding railroads. The case, Lexington and Ohio Rail Road Company v. 
Applegate and Others, focused on whether railroads constituted a public nuisance. The 
case set a precedent for how courts and legislatures dealt with the new and evolving 
technology of railroads. Kentucky's and America's acceptance of the railroad as a new 
and efficient form of transportation technology evolved throughout the 1820s and 1830s. 
The Applegate case marked a transition in railroad law in both Kentucky and the United 
States. Applegate reflected the importance of judge-made law in the development of 
early big-business in America. Had the common law been upheld and viewed as 
inflexible by judges and legislatures, modem business and interstate commerce would not 
have developed in a fashion familiar to most Americans. In addition to Applegate, the 
charters of two early Kentucky railroads will be examined to demonstrate the significant 
changes that occurred in legal doctrine in relation to railroads. Railroads, as the first big 
business in the United States, forced an evolution of legal principles which effected the 
early promotion and financing oflarge scale transportation projects. On the eve of the 
Civil War, courts and legislatures took on a new role as the promoters of industry, rather 
than just the makers and interpreters of law. 
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In 182-1830 session, the Kentucky Legislature approved the charter for the 
Lexington and Ohio Rail Road Company, the L & 0.1 The legislature chartered the 
company with the task of constructing a railroad between Lexington and one or more 
points along the Ohio River.2 Louisville, already a major river trading city by 1830, 
became the desired terminal for the new railroad. Originally conceived as a railroad to 
bypass Louisville and provide Lexington a direct access to New Orleans trade, it became 
apparent that constructing a line to Louisville made the most sense, as it allowed 
Lexington access to the already lucrative trade market.3 In a petition to the Kentucky 
legislature, the railroad's supporters stated: 
We are ... deeply impressed with this truth, the undersigned are anxious that 
Kentucky should commence a system of Rail Roads, the extension of which, 
when completed, will give the people of Kentucky all the advantages of such 
roads can afford. 4 
For Kentucky and most of the United States, the concept of a railroad running 
though the countryside at a speed faster than horses, carrying more passengers and freight 
than the average wagon, at first appeared threatening.5 Early railroad law and legal 
challenges to railroad construction and operation exhibited the widespread fear and 
misunderstanding of technology. 6 Unlike canals or turnpikes where a single company 
owned the right of way and allowed individuals and small business partnerships to utilize 
1 There is no recent history of the Lexington and Ohio Rail Road, which was one of the first railroads in the 
United States. For the only academic writing concerning the history of the L & 0 see: Thomas D. Clark, 
"The Lexington and Ohio Railroad-A Pioneer Venture," Register o/the Kentucky Historical Society 31 
(January 1933): 9-28. 
2 Clark, "The Lexington and Ohio Railroad-A Pioneer Venture," 10. 
3 Ibid., 11. 
4 "To the Honorable Senate and House of Representatives of the Commonwealth of Kentucky," January 15, 
1830. James Guthrie Collection, Filson Historical Society. 
5James Ely, Railroads and American Law (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 2001),200. 
6 James Ely, "The Railroad Has Burst Through State Limits:' Railroads and State Commerce, 1830-1920," 
Arkansas Law Review and State Bar lournal55 (October 2003): 933-980. 
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the canal or road for transportation, railroads acted in a different fashion. 7 Most railroads 
operated as private companies which not only owned the right of way but owned and ran 
the locomotives, which pulled cars of passengers and freight. 8 Instead of constituting a 
private conveyance open to individual travelers to provide their own form of 
transportation, railroads controlled the right of way and the means of locomotion. Early 
litigation against railroads represented the public's fears of transportation monopolies that 
deprived the use of property, sought cheaper goods and labor from outside sources, and 
ran over women and children in the street.9 The building of canals and turnpikes brought 
to the forefront important legal rules and doctrines that courts and legislators applied to 
railroads. 10 
An examination of the legal world in which early Kentucky railroads existed must 
begin with a discussion of the chartering process. Most states in the early nineteenth 
century did not have general incorporation laws. I I The supporters for a new turnpike, 
canal, or railroad lobbied the state legislature in order to gain a charter which granted the 
rights and responsibilities of the new company. In most cases, the charter also included 
specific language that dealt with the issue of funding or how the company was to raise 
capital to commence construction. A charter stipulated the general route the new railroad 
was to run. For example the Kentucky Legislature'S 1829 charter for the Lexington and 
Ohio dictated that the railroad was built from Lexington to one or more points along the 
7 Alfred DuPont Chandler, The Visible Hand: The Managerial Revolution in American Business 
(Cambridge, MA.: Belknap Press, 1977) 284. 
8 With few exceptions, notably in the South, railroads in America often received little to no direct 
government aid. 
9 Ely, Railroads and American Law, 10-11. 
10 Ibid., 11. 
II Kermit Hall, The Magic Mirror: Law in American Society (New York: Oxford University Press, 1989), 
120. 
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Ohio River. 12 If the railroad desired to build any further, the legislature had to amend the 
original charter to reflect the change. 13 When the L & O's directors desired to extend its 
line through Louisville to a point near or along the Falls of the Ohio, the railroad sought 
and received a charter amendment from the legislature. 14 
Common law did not allow general statues concerning the incorporation of a 
company. IS Instead, any major company that issued stocks, bonds, or received local 
governmental support had to seek out a charter in the state legislature. 16 The charter 
served as the act which incorporated the company and as an enabling document which 
guaranteed specific rights, privileges, and duties to the company. Before general 
incorporation laws came into effect in Kentucky, the state legislature spent a great deal of 
its time concerned with private legislation, such as issuing company charters and settling 
property disputes. I? Private legislation allowed landowners to construct dams on their 
property, incorporated railroad, canal, and turnpike companies, and dealt with property 
disputes. 
Over one half of the 1829 charter of the L & 0 contained specific information on 
how the new company was to raise capital in the form of stock subscriptions. The charter 
allowed the railroad to issue ten thousand shares of stock at $100 each, for a total 
capitalization of $1 ,000,000. 18 Furthermore, the charter prohibited the railroad from 
handing out stock as gifts to anyone. All stock had to be paid for at the time of 
12 An Act to incorporate the Lexington and Ohio Rail Road Company (January 27, 1830), Laws of 
Kentucky, Chapter 293, (1829). 
13 Ibid. 
14 LeXington and Ohio Rail Road v. Applegate, 39 KY. 289 (1839). 
15 Hall, The Magic Mirror, 120-121. 
16 Ely, Railroads and American Law, 19-21. 
17 Hambleton Tapp and James C. Klotter, Kentucky Decades of Discord , 1865-1900 (Frankfort: Kentucky 
Historical Society, 1977), 46. 
18 An Act to incorporate the Lexington and Ohio Rail Road Company (January 27, 1830), Laws of 
Kentucky, Chapter 293. 
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subscription by the purchasing party. Cities, towns, the Commonwealth of Kentucky, 
and the federal government could purchase up to one forth of the stock in the L & 0 if 
those parties wished. 19 
The charter further dictated how long the stock subscription booklets were to be 
left open, and the exact business hours the company allowed for stock purchases during 
the subscription. As soon as the L & 0 sold 3,000 shares of stock, the railroad began 
existence as a corporation subject to both the terms of its legislative charter, and the 
common laws of the Commonwealth of Kentucky. At the time of incorporation, the 
members of the board of directors assumed their duties. The first step, as stipulated by 
the charter was for the board to elect a president, hire civil engineers and other skilled 
laborers in order to begin construction. If the L & 0 needed to borrow money from a 
bank or individual, the state charter set forth more provisions in order to do SO.20 
Even though the L&O received full corporate powers after the railroad sold three 
thousand shares of stock, the company could not operate until it completed fifteen miles 
of track. This provision most likely existed as a means to encourage the company's 
board of directors to continue construction of the railroad to its eventual destination along 
the Ohio River. Furthermore, the charter contained a clause that allowed any other 
railroad which received incorporation in the Commonwealth of Kentucky to connect with 
the Lexington and Ohio Rail Road as long as the new railroad did not pose "economic 
harm" to the L & O,zl Such a provision in the charter demonstrated an early nineteenth 
century view of business and competition. Reflecting the then state oflegal doctrine on 
corporations, the directors and stockholders of the L & 0, expected that charters provide 
19 Ibid. 
20 Ibid. 
21 Ibid. The charter did not stipulate exactly what constituted "economic harm." 
30 
for a legally-sanctioned economic monopoly over trade and transportation in the area in 
which the companies ran. For example, Pennsylvania prohibited any railroad in the state 
from connecting to any other railroad which originated outside ofthe state.22 This 
provision in all of the early Pennsylvania railroad charters and statute prohibited 
interstate connection because of the general fear that a railroad from out of state would 
siphon off business and thereby ruin farmers, investors, and merchants. For example, 
prominent leaders in Erie, Pennsylvania feared that any railroad which ran through town 
and connected with another line which originated in Ohio could destroy any business, as 
goods and supplies could be easily transported from "foreign" locations.23 The charter of 
the Lexington and Ohio did not contain such a strict prohibition. The provision which 
allowed connections of other railroads, however, served the same purpose. Any railroad 
which wished to connect with the L & 0 had to benefit both lines. The concept of 
competition being unfair and destructive emanated from the common law traditions that 
permeated the United States legal doctrine in the 1820s.24 Once localism began to break 
down after the Civil War and commerce transformed into regional and national trade, the 
idea of competing, interconnected railroads that formed a nationwide network became the 
norm.25 In the early years of the nineteenth century, though, companies like the 
Lexington and Ohio served just one purpose, to encourage trade between Ohio River 
steamboats and the inland city of Lexington. The issues of nuisance, trade protectionism, 
and the future of railroads in Kentucky all became entwined in major litigation. 
22 Ely, "The Railroad Has Burst Through State Limits," 935. 
23 Ibid., 935-936. 
24 Hall, The Magic Mirror, 40-41. 
25 George R. Taylor and Irene B. Neu, The American Railroad Network, 1861-1890 (Cambridge, MA.: 
Harvard University Press, 1956),29. 
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By 1839, although the L & 0 was not up to full operation, the company did a 
considerable business on the short section that ran from downtown Louisville to the 
eastern edge ofthe city. The grade which connected that segment with the rest of the 
railroad at Frankfort neared completion and awaited additional capital to purchase rails in 
order to complete the line. The original terminus of the railroad in Louisville, near the 
Fourth Street wharf, did not provide the optimal spot in which to load railroad cars from 
steam boats. A new terminal near the lower gauge of the Ohio River allowed trains to 
load goods for New Orleans and St. Louis.26 Portland was the major area of departure 
and arrival for downriver steamboats, while smaller boats traversed the Louisville and 
Portland Canal around the Falls of the Ohio, and upriver.27 Seeking to extend the railroad 
downriver from the falls, the L & 0 received a supplemental act of the Kentucky 
Legislature in 1833 which permitted the construction of a railroad line downriver from 
the falls. 28 The L & 0 completed the line through the city streets in April of 1838. The L 
& 0 then extended its tracks from a point near the comer of Jefferson and Sixth streets, 
down Sixth Street, and onto Main Street. Next the railroad laid tracks down the middle 
of Main Street until it reached Thirteenth Streets.29 Main Street in 1838 was Louisville's 
busiest street, a hub of trade and commerce for not only the City of Louisville, but a large 
region around it. 30 The building of a railroad down the middle of the street soon caused 
26 The Louisville and Portland Canal existed as this time, but the small size of the project did not allow 
larger steamboats to pass through. For a history of the Louisville and Portland Canal see Paul B. Trescott, 
"The Louisville and Portland Canal Company, 1825-1874," The Mississippi Valley Historical Review 44 
(March 1958): 686-708. 
27 The neighborhoods of Portland and Shippingport once existed outside the city limits of Louisville until 
urbanization swallowed both. Shippingport became an island with the construction of the locks which 
replaced the Louisville and Portland Canal, allowing a direct path over the Falls of the Ohio. 
28 Lexington and Ohio Rail Road v. Applegate et aI., 39 KY. 289 (1839). 
29 Ibid. 
30 Ellen Birkett Morris, "Main Street," in The Encyclopedia of Louisville, John Kleeber, ed. (Lexington: 
University Press of Kentucky, 2001), 584-585. 
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alarm among property owners in the area. Louisvillians came to believe that the railroad, 
with its noisy steam locomotives and horse-drawn cars, infringed on their property rights 
and created a nuisance.31 The potential of a busy rail line running down Main Street 
caused property owners, lead by Elisha Applegate, to seek a legal remedy in the 
Chancery Court of Louisville. Elisha Applegate and forty-three other property owners 
brought suit against the L & 0 alleging that the railroad damaged their property by its 
presence in the streets of Louisville. 
On October 26, 1838, the Louisville Chancery Court issued a temporary 
injunction against the Lexington and Ohio Rail Road from utilizing its trackage on Main 
Street.32 The court cited the claims of nuisance by Applegate and others, caused by the 
presence of the L & 0 in the middle of Main Street.33 Soon after the initial injunction, 
attorneys representing the railroad counter claims which disputed the claims of the 
plaintiffs. Next, the court took twenty six depositions in the case.34 Ten ofthe 
depositions represented the property owners, while the remaining sixteen represented the 
Lexington and Ohio Railroad. Part of the original complaint by Applegate stated that the 
city of Louisville abused its incorporation rights by granting the railroad permission to 
construct a line through the City of Louisville on streets originally laid out and approved 
by the Virginia House of Burgesses in 1781.35 The violation, the plaintiffs argued, arose 
from the use of public space for private enterprise. 
31 Nineteenth century Americans who opposed railroad construction often used the imagery of trains 
carelessly running down pedestrians in the street. 
32 Lexington and Ohio Rail Road v. Applegate et al., 39 KY. 289 (1839). 
33 English common law already had precedent dealing with a superior form of transportation competing 
with an older one. See, The King v. Edward Pease and others, 24 Eng. Com. Law Rep. 17 (1792). 
34 Lexington and Ohio Rail Road v. Applegate et al., 39 KY. 289 (1839). 
35 Ibid., 292-293. 
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After hearing the witnesses and evidence, the Chancery Court of Louisville issued 
a permanent injunction against the Lexington and Ohio Rail Road Company from 
operating trains of any sort through the streets of downtown Louisville.36 The court cited 
two infractions which caused an irreparable nuisance to the property owners on Main 
Street. First, the court found that the city of Louisville abused its original charter granted 
when Louisville was still part of Virginia, by reserving a portion of that street for a 
private company to place railroad tracks. By allowing a nuisance to be constructed on the 
city streets, the city violated its charter as well as infringed on the property rights of the 
owners of businesses and property on Main Street.37 
The Court's second finding centered on whether the construction and operation of 
a railroad in the city streets of Louisville posed a hazard to both pedestrian and horse 
traffic. The practice of constructing railroad tracks down the middle of city streets was 
common throughout the United States during the period of early railroad development. 38 
Railroads often took such measures because it allowed direct access to the business 
center of the city, whereas, had the L & 0 stopped construction when it reached the edge 
of the city, it stood to lose business and freight due to being in a less-desirable location. 
In accordance to fears of fast-moving trains going down the middle of packed public 
thoroughfares, most towns and cities enacted ordinances restricting the speed of trains 
when passing through city streets. In Louisville, trains moving down Main Street had to 
obey a maximum speed of six miles per hour.39 
36 Ibid., 293. 
37 Ibid., 293 
38 Notable examples of railroads running down city streets in the nineteenth century could be found in 
Baltimore, New York City, Lafayette, Indiana, Chicago, and New Albany, Indiana. 
39 Lexington and Ohio Rail Road v. Applegate et al., 39 KY. 289 (1839). 
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After the Louisville Chancery Court issued its opinion, the L & 0 appealed the 
case to the Kentucky Court of Appeals. The railroad had appealed a similar case several 
years before in 0 'Hara v. The Lexington and Ohio Rail Road Company.40 The issue with 
that case was whether the Commonwealth of Kentucky or the railroad had the power of 
eminent domain, without the permission of the landowner or the payment to the 
landowner the financial equivalent of the property taken. The L & 0 attempted to take 
O'Hara's land, but did not want to give him adequate compensation. As a result, the L & 
o lost on appeal. Unlike the O'Hara case, the L & 0 experienced a different outcome the 
second time it appeared in front of the Court of Appeals. Chief Justice George 
Robertson, after hearing the appeal, overturned the ruling of the Louisville Chancery 
Court finding no evidence of nuisance against the property owners along Main Street.41 
In writing his opinion, Robertson held that the Chancellor in Louisville had 
incorrectly applied the law. Public roads, Robertson wrote, were open to public 
transportation, including private stagecoach companies and other similar businesses.42 If 
the city government of Louisville authorized the construction of a railroad through the 
city streets and the railroad was for the public good, then the city could do SO.43 Second, 
the city streets of Louisville existed for the use by not only the property owners on Main 
Street, but for all who used them. Louisville, as owner of the streets, had the sole 
decision on whether to allow or not allow the use of the streets for the construction of a 
40 O'Hara v. The Lexington and Ohio Rail Road Company, 32 KY 232 (1833). 
41 George Robertson (1790-1874), noted Kentucky politician, attorney, and jurist. During Robertson's 
years on the Court of Appeals he wrote important opinions in a number of cases. In addition to the 
Applegate case, Robertson authored several important and controversial opinions. In Carico v. 
Commonwealth Robertson argued that when a person was previously threatened by man of "violent 
passions" he could then kill the person on their next encounter, even by shooting the person in the back. 
For more on George Robertson, see George Robertson, Outline o/the Life o/George Robertson, Written by 
Himself With and Introduction by His Son (Lexington, KY.: fl.p., 1875). 
42 Lexington and Ohio Rail Road v. Applegate et al., 39 KY. 289 (1839). 
43 Ibid., 296. 
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railroad.44 Therefore, the city of Louisville was free to authorize a railroad to construct 
tracks and operate trains in the streets, as it owned the street and could do with it what it 
wished.45 
Robertson's ruling then turned to the issue of whether the operation of trains 
down the streets of Louisville constituted a safety hazard and a nuisance. On both 
counts, Robertson disagreed with the Chancellor in Louisville. Robertson stated that 
since all vehicles had the right to use public streets, then railroads also possessed a 
similar right. Second, if the operation of trains on Main Street constituted a nuisance 
because of their noise and potential to run over pedestrians, then any wagon, horse, or 
even a person traveling down Main Street also constituted a nuisance.46 To further make 
the point, Robertson stated that the only claim for nuisance by Applegate and others 
could be that the presence of rails down the street, which Robertson argued did not 
constitute a nuisance or danger.47 
Further making his point, Robertson stated that steam powered trains on Main 
Street also did not constitute a nuisance. Robertson's reasoning lay in the concept that 
few factory or mill owners who used boilers and steam power came under nuisance law 
suits due to their use of steam power.48 Steamboats, he added, also did not constitute a 
nuisance even though they were the dominant force on the rivers and streams throughout 
the area.49 
44 Ibid., 295. 
45 For an explanation of how courts applied common carrier status on railroads, see Ely, Railroads and 
American Law. 
46 Ely, Railroads and American Law, 205-206. 
47 Lexington and Ohio Rail Road v. Applegate et al., 39 KY. 299 (1839). 
48 Ibid. The L & 0 had not yet adopted steam power for its trains on the section of track in Louisville, the 
trains that the railroad ran through Louisville were powered by horse, just like the fIrst trains on the 
Baltimore and Ohio Railroad. 
49 Lexington and Ohio Rail Road v. Applegate et al., 39 KY. 302 (1839). 
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Robertson then listed the possible accidents, such as when a train might 
accidentally run over something or a train could block passage on the street for a short 
time, to demonstrate how none of the potential occurrences constituted a permanent 
nuisance. 50 Robertson's ruling also contained several phrases pointed to the commercial 
and technological advantages of railroads as a form of transportation and how these 
potential benefits outweighed any claim of nuisance by property owners in Louisville. 
Robertson argued, 
The onward spirit of the age must, to a reasonable extent, have its way. The law is 
made for the times, and will be made or modified by them. The expanded and 
still expanding genius of the common law should adapt it here, as elsewhere, to 
the improved and improving condition of our country and our countrymen. And 
therefore, rail roads and locomotive steam cars-the offspring, as they will also 
be the parents, of progressive improvement-should not, in themselves, be 
considered as nuisances, although, in ages that are gone, they might have been so 
held, because they would have been comparatively useless, and therefore more 
mischievous.51 
In one paragraph, Robertson stated that technological improvement, when 
existing for the greater good of society, should not be considered a nuisance. Instead, 
common law should change and adapt, as it adapted over many centuries, to meet the 
demands of technological progress in a society which demanded the benefits of such 
progress. In his next paragraph, Robertson then made a telling remark that foreshadowed 
the future of railroad law. 
We know that a zealous and inconsiderate spirit of innovation and improvement 
requires the vigilance and restraint of both reason and law. We are fully aware, 
also, ofthe fact that, when such a spirit is abroad, private rights are in peculiar 
danger, unless sternly guarded by the judiciary; and we are not sure that such 
guardianship is not most needed in a government where whatever is fopular is apt 
to prevail, at first and often at last, only because it is the vox populi. 5 
50 For an explanation of the development of railroad nuisance lawsuits see Ely, Railroads and American 
Law. 
51Lexington and Ohio Rail Road v. Applegate et aI., 39 KY 309 (1839). 
52 Ibid., 309. 
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Applegate set the stage for rail nuisance cases and demonstrated early legal 
attitudes toward railroads. Instead of blindly supporting railroads, the courts and the 
legislatures held them to normal legal principles. When old common law principles no 
longer applied, then judge-made principles should be fashioned to meet the demands of 
the age. Furthermore, the case predicted that popular technology can sometimes, with 
public support, run roughshod over traditional legal principles. The popularity of 
railroads could, in theory, be used to trump other standards of common law. 
With Applegate decided, the L & ° continued its quest to connect Louisville with 
Lexington. However, the 1840s were not a financially prosperous time for the railroad. 
As a result the company underwent reorganization several times throughout the next 
twenty years. 53 This lack of economic prosperity for the L & 0, and other railroads in the 
United States was not a product of individual failure. Instead, railroads like any 
technology, went though a constant process of improvement. The L & 0, for example 
received its charter just two years after the building of the first American railroad in 
1827, the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad.54 Other American railroads of the late 1820s and 
early 1830s were small-scale affairs, designed for the specific purpose of moving goods 
from one point to another.55 The first railroad to adopt steam locomotive technology, the 
South Carolina Railroad, was built to move cotton from inland to the port of Charleston 
53 Paul H. Coonter, "The Role of Railroads in United States Economic Growth," The Journal of Economic 
History 23 (December 1963): 481-482. 
54 Investors in Baltimore, without the necessary capital to build a canal through the mountains of west em 
Maryland, instead tried the relatively-new technology of railroads. For a history of the Baltimore and Ohio 
Railroad see: James D. Dilts, The Great Road: The Building of the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad, the 
Nation's First Railroad (Stanford, CA.: Stanford University Press, 1993). 
55 Early American railroads copied their British counterparts in being built to haul a specific commodity, 
such as coal or cotton. 
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in a more efficient manner.56 These early applications of railway technology faced 
challenges that made almost all examples of early American railroads unprofitable. 
The L & 0 encountered two important legal and legislative battles in the 1840s. 
The first battle centered on the railroad's treatment of others' private property. In early 
1842, William Pope, a prominent Louisville attorney and landowner, filed a breach of 
covenant suit against the L & 0 in regard to property damage incurred by the railroad. 
The suit alleged that the railroad graded its railroad line through Pope's land in eastern 
Louisville. During the construction process, the L & 0' s contractors deforested a tract of 
land for timber, left piles of gravel and large rocks littering the right of way, and did not 
repair wagon damage to Pope's property. 57 In seeking remedy in the Louisville Chancery 
Court, Pope sought a judgment against the railroad and the settlement for the costs of 
repair and reimbursement to the damage done to his property. Pope won his suit, which 
pushed the railroad further into financial problems. Financial problems throughout the 
1840s did not allow the L & 0 to finish the gap in its line between eastern Louisville and 
Frankfort. 58 
The second battle, which the L & 0 faced in the late 1840s concerned help from 
the Kentucky legislature. Beginning in the mid 1840s, groups of Louisville and Frankfort 
businessmen and community leaders lobbied the legislature to re-charter the L & O. The 
new charter, if passed, allowed the L & 0 to issue more stock and bonds in order to 
complete the line between Louisville and Frankfort.59 A strong coalition of merchants 
56 The South Carolina Railroad became the first railroad in the United States to operate a steam locomotive 
in regular service in 1829-1830 
57 William Pope v. The Lexington and Ohio Rail Road Company, William Pope Papers, Filson Historical 
Society .. 
58 James Guthrie to John Wesley Hunt, May 28, 1839. James Guthrie Papers, Filson Historical Society. 
59 Ibid. 
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and community leaders in northern Kentucky helped defeat the proposal.60 These 
merchants, who prospered from nearby Cincinnati, feared that the completion of the L & 
o could negatively impact their trade with central Kentucky. Defeated in the legislature, 
directors of the L & 0 including Louisville attorney James Guthrie, sought help from the 
city of Louisville in securing financing to complete the railroad.61 The mayor and 
general council of Louisville agreed to loan money to the L & 0 with the provision that 
the city become the principal majority shareholder in the L & O. The railroad refused the 
offer and continued its struggle throughout the 1840s and 1850s. 
The failure to reach a favorable financing agreement with Louisville hampered 
the working relationship between the railroad and city. Previously, Louisville's general 
council set up a committee to assist the L & 0 by exploring possible expansion, including 
a proposed line southward from Louisville.62 After studying the various proposals for 
expansion, the city and railroad reached an agreement that expansion of the railroad 
southward was to not occur without the city's approval. 
Despite early unpredictability, railroads in the United States captured the 
imaginations of investors and the general public. The result was a "railroad mania" that 
swept much of the country. Between 1831 and 1832 the Ohio legislature incorporated 
over twelve new railroads, of which one was completed by the end of the decade.63 
Despite the public excitement over the railroad, the canal still reigned supreme in 
American transportation throughout much of the East and Middle West. Canals, while 
60 "To the Honorable Senate and House of Representatives of the Commonwealth of Kentucky," n.d. James 
Guthrie Papers, Filson Historical Society. 
61 Ibid. 
62 "City of Louisville in Agreement with the Lexington and Ohio Rail Road Company," December 2, 1836, 
Filson Historical Society. 
63 Coonter, "The Role of Railroads in United States Economic Growth," 481. 
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able to traverse hilly and mountainous regions, often required more capital investment 
than railroads to operate and maintain. Even in the states which were early adopters of 
railroads, the technology had not advanced enough to provide direct prosperity to these 
companies, thus causing a depression in the industry throughout the early to mid 1840s.64 
Cheaper forms of competing transportation, overproduction of foodstuffs and thus lower 
crop prices, and bad weather all combined to create unfavorable economic conditions for 
the construction of new railroads. When the nation recovered from the economic 
downturn in the mid 1840s investors focused on neglected industries.65 Railroads east of 
the Appalachian Mountains began improvement, not necessarily expansion, to meet the 
demands of the new industries that dotted the East. While railroad building slowed in the 
East, railroads modernized and took advantage of technological improvements in track 
construction, iron production, and locomotive design to improve the profitability of 
lines.66 In the South and West, however, the construction of railroads quickened 
throughout the 1840s as towns and cities sought to improve connections with the river 
trade on the Ohio and Mississippi Rivers.67 By 1847, due to the population expansion in 
the western states, serious bottlenecks developed for large shipments from the West to 
Eastern markets.68 Most large shipments used the Erie Canal which could only operate 
seven months a year, and even with several expansions the canal could not handle the 
increased capacity.69 It was during this period that investors turned to the railroads. The 
possibility of one or more railroads crossing the Appalachian Mountains and connecting 
64 Ibid., 483-484. 
65 Chandler, The Visible Hand, 331. 
66 Coonter, "The Role of Railroads in United States Economic Growth." 485-486. 
67 Timothy R. Mahoney, River Towns of the Great West: The Structure of Provincial Urbanization in the 
American Midwest, 1820-1870 (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1990),79. 
68 George R. Taylor, The Transportation Revolution,1815-1860, (New York: Reinhart, 1951),48. 
69 Ibid., 50-51. 
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with Ohio's canals, other railroads on the Ohio River became an important rallying cry 
for western and southern cities. In addition, investors and local officials viewed railroad 
transportation as a method to connect cities and regions. By the late 1840s, the canal 
boom subsided and investors came to realize the limited potential of turnpikes, macadam 
roads, and plank roads to provide large-scale heavy transportation.70 While a few canals 
prospered, other projects like the ambitious Chesapeake and Ohio Canal never reached 
their final intended destinations. In the case of the C & 0 canal, the Baltimore and Ohio 
Railroad beat the canal to the Ohio River on a near-duplicate route and the investors, after 
suffering years of financial loss, decided to cut their losses and operate the canal only as 
far as Cumberland, Maryland.7l While river transportation on the western rivers 
expanded, railroads investors, farmers, and merchants viewed railroads as an important 
link in the chain of improved transportation throughout the country. It was during the 
resurgence of the railroad in the late 1840s that Kentucky's most ambitious railroad 
project was born -- the Louisville and Nashville Railroad, the L & N. 
Just as prominent citizens and merchants in Lexington had previously promoted 
the L & 0, the business community of Louisville created, lobbied, and owned the 
Louisville and Nashville Railroad for its first thirty years of existence. Even though the L 
& N connected two major southern cities, the primary purpose of the railroad was to 
serve the Louisville business community. As a bonus, the line provided improved 
transportation for farmers in central and north central Tennessee, as well as allowed the 
construction of several feeder lines to expand the railroad's service area.72 Still, few 
70 Taylor, The Transportation Revolution, 82. 
71 The C & 0 canal, after years of losses became a property of the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad, which 
allowed use of the canal until the 1920s. The entire canal is now a National Historic Site. 
72 Maury Klein, History of the Louisville and Nashville Railroad (New York: Macmillan, 1972), 12. 
42 
knew if the sparse agriculture area between the two cities could provide enough business 
to support a railroad.73 
Talk and promotion of a scheme to construct a railroad between Louisville and 
Nashville had begun as early as 1832.74 However, the difficulties witnessed in 
constructing a railroad between Louisville and Lexington forced reality to set in for the 
time being. The hard economic times of the early 1840s also cooled the project. When 
prosperity returned, so did calls to construct a line between the two cities. By 1850, 
public clamor for such a project reached its peak. At a public meeting in late 1849, city 
officials in Louisville passed a resolution promising to subscribe to $1,000,000 in city 
funds for stock.75 Kentucky Governor John L. Helm also wanted such a project to 
commence and used his political muscle to force the Kentucky legislature to act.76 
Before the legislature was a bill authorizing the construction of a railroad from Louisville 
to Bowling Green, a town on the Barren River about 70 miles north ofNashville.77 Helm 
lobbied to have an alternate bill, the one to charter the L & N brought before the 
legislature instead. 
Later in the 1850 legislative session, the legislature passed the charter for the 
Louisville and Nashville Railroad, which allowed the construction of a rail line south 
from Louisville to the Tennessee state line. Earlier, on March 9, 1850, the Tennessee 
state legislature chartered the same company with the task of building a line from the 
73 Ibid., 13. 
74 Before the L & 0 reached a formal agreement with the City of Louisville not to expand southward, 
James Guthrie hoped to use a new charter for the L & 0 to complete the line between Lexington and 
Louisville and start work on a line to Nashville. 
75 Kincaid A. Herr, The Louisville and Nashville Railroad, 1850-1963 (Louisville, KY.: L & N Public 
Relations Department, 1964), 18. 
76 Klein, History o/the Louisville and Nashville Railroad, 12-13. 
77 Ibid., 13. 
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state line to Nashville.78 The charter issued by the Kentucky legislature for the L & N 
reflected legal change from the charter granted twenty one years earlier to the Lexington 
and Ohio. Because the charter of the L & N specified that the railroad was to travel south 
from Louisville to the state line, the route was fixed as to which counties the railroad 
would pass through. The charter contained the names of ninety seven individuals who 
lived in the counties in which the L & N was to pass. Those backers included several 
notable Kentucky names. Prominent Louisvillians James S. and Joshua Speed 
represented Louisville and Jefferson County respectively?9 John L. Helm, governor of 
Kentucky, represented his native Hardin County and lent tremendous political support to 
the project. Any three individuals listed in the charter who represented the same county 
could open the subscription books in that county given proper notice to the citizens and 
potential investors. Unlike the charter for the Lexington and Ohio, the charter allowed 
the L & N to keep its subscription books open for as long as necessary to sell the stock at 
hand. The charter stipulated that the L & N was to sell no more than $3,000,000 in stock 
at shares of $1 00 each.80 If all of the original stock was not subscribed to within ten 
years of the charter's passage, then the charter, as well as the stock, became null and 
void.8! 
Whereas the original charter for the L & 0 contained a provision which allowed 
the federal government to purchase shares of stock in the railroad, the charter for the L & 
N contained no such provision. In the period before the federal government encouraged 
78 "An Act to charter the Camp Creek Turnpike Company in the county of Sumner, and for other purposes. 
(February 1, 1850) Laws of Tennessee, Chapter 118. 





railroad construction in the West with land grants, state and local governments provided 
the only public investment for internal improvements.82 Some southern states, Georgia 
for instance, used state ownership as a method of railroad financing. 83 Kentucky's 
legislature did not want to get into the railroad business. Thus, the charter for the L & N 
did contain provisions allowing the city of Louisville to purchase stock, as well as the 
counties the railroad was to pass through. 84 In order for a local government to subscribe 
to L & N stock, a vote had to be taken among all eligible voters. As a way to encourage 
stock sales, the L & N announced that it would plan its route from Louisville to Nashville 
based on individual stock subscriptions ofthe counties. Nelson County, for example, 
failed to approve the stock SUbscription and the railroad's mainline bypassed the county 
in favor of Hardin County which subscribed to stock.85 
In addition to the general stipulations regarding the duties of the president and 
board of directors of the new railroad, the charter of the L & N granted it extraordinary 
power to condemn land.86 The charter spelled out that the L & N had to condemn land 
for actual use by the railroad and not condemn land for speculative purposes. The right 
of way had to be no wider than thirty six feet, other than in locations where the railroad 
was to build depots, shop building, and other structures that the railroad deemed 
necessary in order to operate. The L & N also had to provide crossings, referred to as 
82 Most federally-fmanced internal improvement projects did not pass Congress until after April 1861 when 
the Southern Congressional delegation left. For a legislative history of the era see; Leonard P. Curry, 
Blueprintfor Modern America: Non-Military Legislation of the First Civil War Congress (Nashville, TN.: 
Vanderbilt University Press, 1968). 
83 Stover, The Railroads of the South, 47-53. 
84 Both of the potential routes for the L & N posed potential engineering problems. The route that the 
railroad's directors eventually settled on allowed for an easier connection with Memphis. Bardstown and 
Glasgow, two towns shunned by the L & N mainline constructed their own railroads to meet the L & N. 
85 Purcell, Louisville and the Origins of the Louisville and Nashville Railroad, 5-7. 
86 "An Act to charter the Louisville and Nashville Railroad Company (March 5, 1850) Laws of Kentucky, 
Chapter 382. 
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wagon ways in the charter, to fanners who needed to cross the tracks in order to gain 
ingress and egress to a main road or other parts of their property. 87 
The Kentucky legislature granted the L & N tremendous power to initiate legal 
proceedings in order to condemn the land necessary to build the railroad. Under terms of 
the charter, the railroad notified the local Justice of the Peace ifit wished to initiate 
condemnation proceedings against a landowner.88 The Justice of the Peace then issued a 
bill for the proceeding, and assembled a jury pool of twenty individuals. The jury could 
not be composed of adjacent landowners nor those related to the landowner. The Justice 
of the Peace then whittled down the jury pool to twelve persons and conducted a hearing 
regarding the condemnation of the land.89 The Justice of the Peace charged the jury with 
the job of viewing the land in question and assessing a fair price. The railroad then paid 
the property owner for the condemned land. The charter contained specific language 
stating that the jury was to take into consideration the terms of compensation for any 
benefit, perceived or real, which enhanced the value of the property the railroad wished to 
condemn.9o 
The charter for the L & N also contained a provision which allowed the railroad 
power to condemn resources, such as a growth of trees, and the use of land during the 
construction phase of the line.91 The condemnation proceedings, if an agreement could 
not be worked out with the landowner, took on the same form as the proceedings for 
condemnation ofland for use by the railroad's right of way. Unlike the previous railroad 







amount of freedom to deal with financing and construction of the line. In order to allow 
the L & N to get into operation as soon as possible, the charter contained a provision 
allowing the railroad to operate with just five miles of track completed, unlike the fifteen 
miles required ofthe L & O. 
The charter granted the L & N in the Tennessee General Assembly took on a 
much different form than the one issued the company in Kentucky. Unlike the Kentucky 
charter, which the legislature passed as an independent act, the Tennessee General 
Assembly passed the bill as a "rider," a provision attached to a bill incorporating a 
turnpike company. In most aspects, the Tennessee charter defaulted to the L & N's 
Kentucky charter for specific provisions as to financing and construction. The charter 
only contained which counties the L & N was to place its line to Nashville.92 
Stock SUbscription of the L & N began on June 17, 1851 with the Louisville 
council subscribing to $1,000,000.93 On September 4, 1851, the officers of the L & N 
opened the subscription books to the general public and other local governments. The 
provision allowing local subscription resulted in fierce competition between counties to 
breaking OUt.94 Leaders and merchants in Bowling Green feared that the L & N's board 
of directors would construct the line through Glasgow instead. Therefore in an attempt to 
force the company's hand, citizens of Bowling Green acted on an earlier 1850 act of the 
Kentucky legislature allowing a railroad to be built from Bowling Green to the Tennessee 
state line.95 The new company opened subscription books and sent surveyors into the 
92 "An Act to charter the Camp Creek Turnpike Company in the county of Sumner, and for other purposes. 
(February 1, 1850) Laws of Tennessee, Chapter 118. 
93 Purcell, "Louisville and the Origins of the L & N Railroad," 6-8. 
94 Ibid., 8. 
95 Thomas D. Clark, The Beginning of the L & N: The Development of the Louisville and Nashville 
Railroad and its Memphis Branches from 1836 to 1860 (Louisville, KY.: Standard Printing Company, 
1933), 35-38. 
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field. Viewing the new line as a waste of resources, the L & N's board of directors 
negotiated a consolidation of the two companies with the L & N absorbing Bowling 
Green's $1,000,000 stock subscription. At the same time, the city of Louisville nearly 
doubled its holdings in the company with a total of over $1,900,000 in stock holdings. 
Together, the city of Louisville and Louisville merchants and leaders held a majority of 
the L & N stock. Even though Nashville subscribed to a large portion of stock, Louisville 
interests dominated the L & N for much of its first thirty years of existence. 
While the L & N signed several contracts for iron rail, timber, and masonry work, 
major financial problems ensued. The problems pitted the railroad's management against 
the company's majority stockholder, the City of Louisville. The L & N wished to sell 
bonds on the European bond market in order to pay for the initial construction costs of 
the line. James Guthrie, an early proponent of railroads in Kentucky, arranged for the 
sale of the bonds in London.96 A printing and delivery delay placed the bonds on the 
European market just before the Crimean War broke out. That war, combined with an 
agricultural drought in Europe, forced the bonds to sell low and as a result they did not 
raise the amount of capital Guthrie and the L & N's board of directors wished.97 The 
downturn in the bond market made the task of raising European and New York capital 
almost impossible. The lack of an incoming cash flow caused construction to suspend on 
the railroad in 1853. The work stoppage was to be one of several that haunted the 
railroad during the difficult years of construction. 
In order to attain more investment capital and provide feeder routes to the 
railroad, the L & N attained supplements to its charter in 1853 and in 1854 to construct 
96 "James Guthrie Dead"," The Louisville Courier-Journa/14 March 1869, sec l. 
97 Klein, History of the Louisville and Nashville Railroad, 9. 
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two branches. In addition, the L & N purchased the Bardstown and Louisville Railroad, a 
branchline operation financed by merchants in Nelson County to connect Bardstown with 
the L & N mainline.98 Lebanon, the county seat of Marion County, was the target of the 
first branchline authorized by the revised state charter. The town, thirty five miles from 
the L & N mainline lay in a rich agricultural landscape which also contained many 
distilleries.99 The second branch line that the L & N began to build ran from a point just 
south of Bowling Green to Memphis, Tennessee. The L & N's board felt that such a line, 
when completed, could provide a competitive form of transportation for goods to and 
from New Orleans. 
The resurgence in the European bond market, combined with more financial help 
from the Louisville government, gave the L & N enough capital to begin finishing the 
line between Louisville and Nashville. With two construction crews working from the 
Louisville and Nashville ends respectively, the construction pace, which lagged 
throughout the early 1850s, quickened. The first trains between Louisville and Nashville 
ran on October 31, 1859, with daily service commencing soon afterwards.lOO Even with 
the opening of the L & N, the railroad throughout the 1860s relied on occasional financial 
support from the city of Louisville, which remained a majority stockholder. In 1864, for 
example, James Guthrie brokered an agreement in which the city provided the L & N 
$1,000,000 in cash, in exchange for stock. 101 The L & N then used the money to extend 
the Lebanon branch into southeastern Kentucky. With Louisville financial support 
98 Clark, The Beginning of the L & N, 44. 
99 Stover, The Railroads of the South, 78. 
100 Klein, History of the Louisville and Nashville Railroad, 25. 
\01 "City of Louisville in Agreement with the L & N R.R. Co.," September 8, 1867, James Guthrie 
Collection, Filson Historical Society. 
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factored in, the L & N remained prosperous throughout the 1860s, including the period 
during the Civil War. 102 
The completion ofthe L & N between Louisville and Nashville marked a major 
turning point for both Louisville and Kentucky. The availability of a direct rail route to 
the South placed the city into a dominant position to tap expanding trade markets. The 
construction of the L & N also signaled another phase in the transformation of railroad 
law and public policy in Kentucky and the United States. The public, after overcoming 
initial suspicions, clamored for railroads. 
"The Onward Spirit of the Age," as George Robertson proclaimed, marked a 
transformation in American legal principles. Kentucky's law, no longer hindered the 
development of transportation, particularly railroads. Judges and legislatures became the 
promoters of commerce, especially for early railroads. The intense public appetite for 
railroads soon gave way to the Civil War in which transportation development halted 
throughout much of the United States. The end of the war in 1865 brought new 
challenges and the emergence of the L & N as a prosperous, still intact Southern railroad. 
Railroads in Kentucky were popular in 1859 because the people of Kentucky wanted 
them. Legislatures and courts often tended to the desires of the public and the popularity 
of railroads. In just over twenty five years, the unpopularity of railroads led the industry 
into uncharted political and legal waters. The change of public opinion impacted the 
industry for many years. But first, the economic boom following the Civil War forced 
railroads and cities to fight each other for trade supremacy. 
\02 James Guthrie remained an active supporter of the L & N throughout his stint as Secretary of the 
Treasury from 1853-1857. Throughout his tenure as president of the L & N from 1860-168, he guided the 
railroad through the damaging Civil War years, allowing the company to emerge prosperous in 1865, an 
anomaly among Southern railroads. 
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CHAPTER THREE 
TALES OF THE NEW DEPARTURE: LOUISVILLE, RAILROADS, AND 
KENTUCKY POLITICS, 1865-1872. 
Writing in the 1960s, historian Robert Emmett McDowell characterized the 
position of Louisville during the Civil War in his book, City of Conflict: Louisville in the 
Civil War. McDowell wrote: 
Louisville was guilty of being in the wrong place at the wrong time, of 
being ground between two antagonistic cultural and economic systems. 
Because she was neither northern or southern but partook a little of each, 
she was viewed with suspicion by both sides. In the Confederacy, she was 
considered northern, while the vast majority of people in the North 
regarded Louisville as a southern City.1 
Facing an identity crisis at the end ofthe Civil War, Louisville leaders recognized 
that for Louisville to succeed it must portray itself as a southern city. Crafting that 
image, however, after four years of support for the Union meant overcoming substantial 
obstacles. Following the conclusion of the Civil War, Louisville merchants and 
politicians faced the daunting task of reestablishing political and economic ties with the 
South. Except for a brief period of prosperity during the war, Louisville relied on 
connections to the South for economic survival. After several years of hard work, it 
became clear by 1872 that Louisville had reasserted itself as a southern city. While 
remaining pro-Union during the war, by the 1870s a casual visitor to the city might have 
I Robert Emmett McDowell, City of Conflict: Louisville in the Civil War (Louisville, KY.: Louisville Civil 
War Roundtable, 1962),202. 
51 
thought that Louisville seceded with the rest of the Confederacy. Why did Louisville 
change its political attitudes so soon after the end of the war? An examination of the 
economic and political realities of the era provided the answer. No southern trade meant 
the end to Louisville's preeminent position as a gateway city to the South. Following the 
war, merchants and politicians in Louisville began a transformation to make the city 
"southern." The transformation of Louisville into a Reconstruction-era economic center 
did not, however, occur overnight. Instead, the process began before the war with the 
city's emergence as a trading and manufacturing center for the upper South. In order to 
maintain its trade supremacy, political and business leaders in Louisville resorted to 
extraordinary means to protect their business and political interests. In addition, the 
conflict between the New Departure and the Bourbon factions of the Democratic Party 
during the late 1860s and 1870s allowed the creation of a new southern identity for 
Kentucky and Louisville. Extensive political lobbying, creative business deals and new 
ideas all formed the basis for Louisville's Reconstruction-Era business philosophy. 
The L & N, as well as most other southern railroads, adopted the non-standard 
gauge of five feet between the rails. Where railroads of differing gauges met, freight and 
passengers had to be transferred to the other line, increasing the time of travel between 
two points.2 Another problem, Taylor indicated, was that even railroads of the same 
gauge often did not interchange.3 Only during the Civil War was a temporary connection 
built between the different lines in order to expedite military shipments.4 The adoption of 
a broader gauge meant that cars from northern lines could not be interchanged. Rail 
2 Ibid., 24. 
3 Maury Klein, History of the Louisville and Nashville Railroad (New York: Macillan, 1972),44. 
4 McDowell, City of Conflict, 83. 
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gauge would later play an important role in Louisville's struggle for trade supremacy 
against Cincinnati. 
Louisville's initial entry into commercial trade came only ten years after its 
founding as a city in 1789. In 1799, Congress designated Louisville as a port of entry 
into the United States, the only inland port of entry at the time.5 The city's geographic 
location at the Falls of the Ohio initially meant that cargo going downstream had to be 
offloaded and reloaded. In addition, Louisville's central location meant that it would 
become a key center for the importation and exportation of goods for the rest of 
Kentucky. The introduction of steam boats on the Ohio and Mississippi rivers in 1812 
transformed the trade prospects for Louisville. The flatboat-dominated transportation 
system limited the amount of goods which could come up river from the deeper South 
and limited the commercial growth of river towns. The two-way commerce promoted by 
steam boat transportation allowed Louisville to secure a key role in southern trade. At 
the same time, Kentucky like the rest of the country, underwent the transportation 
revolution. Planners and merchants realized that effective inland transportation was the 
key to fully develop America's natural resources.6 Starting in the early nineteenth 
century, turnpikes, macadam roads, plank roads and canals sprung up all over America to 
meet the increasing demands for direct inland transportation.7 Usually supported by 
private companies, these forms of transportation were not as efficient as river 
transportation and often required large amounts of capital investment for initial 
construction and maintenance. Kentucky hosted a number of turnpike and macadam road 
5 Benjamin Casseday, The History of Louisville From its Early Settlement till the Year 1852 (Louisville, 
KY.: G. R. Clark, 1852),38. 
6 Klein, History of the Louisville and Nashville Railroad, 7. 
7 George Rogers Taylor, The Transportation Revolution 1815-1860 (New York: Rinehart, 1951), 15-23. 
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companies, but never witnessed the development of an extensive canal system like other 
states in the west like Indiana and Ohio.8 The only canal of significance built in 
Kentucky was the Louisville and Portland Canal, built to allow river trade to bypass the 
Falls of the Ohio for a continuous journey southward to New Orleans. 
As successful as river transportation was, it encountered problems. Rivers, like 
canals and turnpikes, remained susceptible to weather.9 Low water delayed shipment of 
goods on the Ohio River for days, if not months. 10 The capital investment required to 
construct and maintain steamboats proved prohibitive for many. The lack of set 
schedules and timetables for the riverboats meant that merchants often resulted to 
guesswork in figuring out when they could ship or receive goods. I I The river system, no 
matter how developed, did not provide a direct route to the Deep South. A better system 
of inland transportation was needed in order for Louisville to prosper fully as a supplier 
to the plantation-based economy of the South. The trade and economic solution lay in 
twin ribbons of iron, an invention developed in England to transport coal. The railroad 
revolution made Louisville into a significant trade center. Louisville's first railroad, the 
Lexington and Ohio, sought to connect Louisville to Lexington. 12 Chartered in 1832, the 
line went bankrupt early on and the line was completed by a successor company, the 
Lexington and Frankfort Railroad. The L & 0 and later the L & F remained important 
for several reasons. First, the line gave Louisville a direct commercial conduit to the 
8 In order to promote his scheme of government-subsidized internal improvements Kentuckian Henry Clay 
had a model canal constructed on his property. Meant to display the merits of canal transportation, it failed 
to catch on, probably due to the Commonwealth's rough terrain and the massive capital investment 
required for such a canal system. 
9 Taylor, The Transportation Revolution, 49-58. 
\0 Leonard P. Curry, Rail Routes South: Louisville's Fight for the Southern Market, J 865-J 872 (Lexington: 
University of Kentucky Press, 1969),9-13. 
II Taylor, The Transportation Revolution, 63. 
12 Richard E. Prince, Louisville and Nashville Steam Locomotives (Green River, WY.: Richard E. Prince, 
1968), 16. 
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central Bluegrass portion of the state. Second, the railroad was initially financed and 
later operated briefly by the Commonwealth of Kentucky. 13 The bad experience of a 
state-invested and later a state-owned railroad forced later railroad ventures in the 
Commonwealth to find alternate forms of financing. While the railroad to Lexington 
failed to connect Louisville with any substantial southern market, it demonstrated the 
viability of railroads to a skeptical public. The combination of river and rail 
transportation in Louisville could become a powerful economic force for the city to 
further dominate trade with the South. 
Discussions to construct a railroad between Louisville and Nashville began in the 
late 1830s. However, it was not until the late l840s that the movement gained 
momentum. Finally, on March 5, 1851 the state legislature granted a charter to the 
newly-established Louisville and Nashville Railroad Company. The General Assembly 
authorized the L & N to issue $3,000,000 worth of stocks and bonds in order to construct 
a railroad from Louisville southward to the Tennessee state line. 14 Earlier in the year, the 
backers of the new railroad received a similar charter from the Tennessee state legislature 
to build a line northward from Nashville to meet the Kentucky portion at the state line. IS 
From an early point, it became clear that the federal government was not going to 
provide aid in the form of loans or bonds to the new railroad company. 16 Likewise, other 
than the initial charters, the state governments of Kentucky and Tennessee did not 
provide any further financial help. The lack of any direct state aid in the construction of 
the L & N stood out from the routes taken by other southern states. Some southern states, 
\3 Ibid., 18. 
14 Klein, History of the Louisville and Nashville Railroad, 14. 
IS Ibid., 14-16 
16 Ibid., 13. 
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like Georgia, provided substantial state aid to railroads, due to a lack of capital 
availability in those regions. 17 Georgia even went a step further, organizing and 
constructing a state-owned railroad from Atlanta to Chattanooga. IS Georgia also granted 
another railroad banking privileges in order for that company to raise capital for a line 
between Atlanta and Savannah. 19 
For construction financing, the Louisville and Nashville took a different approach. 
The railroad relied on local aid in the form of stock subscriptions to raise the necessary 
capital. The L & N even went as far as to use stock subscriptions by towns and counties 
on one of the two proposed routes to Nashville to "vote with their wallets."zo The towns 
and cities raising the most stock received the L & N mainline through their towns, 
ensuring a vital commercial connection with the outside world. 
The City of Louisville, which subscribed to $1,000,000 of stock, became one of 
the largest investors in the L & N?I The city's purchase ofa sizable portion of the L & 
N's stock came at the urging of local and civic leaders who believed Louisville should 
have a substantial say in how the railroad was constructed and operated. Even at this 
early stage in railroad development, a fear of Eastern capital influencing businesses in 
Louisville and the South carried significant weight with the local community. Not only 
did Louisville get a railroad connection with the South, the city government would reap 
economic benefits from being an owner of the company. 
17 John F. Stover, Railroads of the South, 1865-1900: A Study of Finance and Control (Chapel Hill: 
University of North Carolina Press, 1955),94-108. 
18 Ibid, 112. 
19 James W. Ely, Railroads and American Law (Lawrence: University of Kansas Press, 2000), 206. 
20 Klein, History of the Louisville and Nashville Railroad, 2-7. 
21 Ibid, 6. 
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Fraught with difficult terrain, construction delays, material shortages and a lack of 
skilled labor, construction of the L & N continued at a slow pace.22 To help alleviate 
fears of a failed project and provide the new company with some much needed revenue, 
the state legislature amended the original charter of the L & N, allowing two branch lines 
to be built from the main line to Bardstown and Lebanon respectively.23 Both towns lay 
at the center of prosperous farming areas, and also were home to numerous distilleries, 
which provided the L & N significant income from the transportation of whiskey to 
Louisville for shipment down the Ohio River. 
From an early date, Louisville exerted a significant degree of control over the L & 
N. The railroad's first president, L. L. Shreve resigned after the Louisville Board of 
Alderman expressed a lack of confidence. Capital shortages and a failure to attract 
limited investment from either New York or London forced a stoppage of work. 
Dissatisfied, the Louisville Board of Alderman wished to find a new leader for the 
company who could tum the financial fortunes of the company around. New stock issues 
and progress of building the line southward enhanced the fledgling company's fortunes. 
Under a new president, John Helm, the company completed the link between Louisville 
and Nashville in 1859?4 With connections in Nashville, Louisville then had a trade 
outlet where a carload of goods could be shipped from Louisville directly to the Deep 
South. Newspapers of the era heralded the completion of the line.25 
22 Aaron D. Purcell, "Louisville and the Origins of the L & N Railroad, " Register of the Kentucky 
Historical Society 95 (Winter 1997), 7. 
23 Kincaid A. Herr, The Louisville and Nashville Railroad 1851-1963 (Louisville, KY.: L & N Public 
Relations Department, 1964),39. 
24 Jo1m Helm, a resident of Elizabethtown in Central Kentucky, became a leading pro-secessionist leader in 
Kentucky. Helm later ascended to the Governorship of Kentucky. 
25 "Railroad Completed!," Louisville Journal, 28 October 1859, 1. 
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Even before completion of the L & N, Louisville merchants stressed the 
importance of trade with the South. The plantation-based economy of the South played 
into Louisville's strengths as a commercial city. The many merchants, who supplied 
everything from dry goods to hardware and farm implements, courted plantation owners. 
Owners made annual supply trips to Louisville. While in town, they usually stayed in the 
finest hotels and dined in the finest restaurants.26 The supply needs of plantations and 
farms in the rural South gave a direct market for Louisville goods. Completion of the L 
& N into Nashville facilitated faster and more efficient delivery. While Cincinnati was 
larger and also was a center of manufacturing, the direct route from Louisville placed its 
merchants at a distinct advantage over their Ohio counterparts.27 
Louisville experienced its new trade route with the South only a short time before 
the outbreak of the Civil War in April 1861. The same reasons that made Louisville a 
strategic commercial center before the war made it a valuable location for both the Union 
and Confederate armies. The L & N especially proved to be a valuable asset to the Union 
Army to conduct supply operations during a possible invasion of the South.28 With their 
natural trading routes to the South blocked by the war, Louisville merchants began to 
focus their energies on the immense supply demands of the Union Army. The supply 
role that Louisville played during the Civil War made up for the loss of business. It 
allowed Louisville business leaders to contemplate the future of trade with the South 
once the war ended. 
26 Curry, Rail Routes South, 58. 
27 Cincinnati outclassed Louisville in almost every economic category. The traditional supplier to southern 
Ohio and much of Indiana and parts of Illinois, Cincinnati could never make a significant break into the 
southern market due to the lack of adequate transportation. 
28 McDowell, City of Conflict, 78. 
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The announcement of the surrender of Robert E. Lee's forces in April 1865 
brought celebration and jubilation in the streets of Louisville.29 The four year conflict 
that divided the nation and Kentucky had come to an end. While the celebration 
commenced, the realities of Louisville's role in a new southern economy, combined with 
the political turmoil that Kentucky faced after the Civil War, placed Louisville in the 
crosshairs of several enemies. Upriver from Louisville, the larger city of Cincinnati eyed 
Louisville's trade position with the South. Previously viewed as a northern city, business 
and political leaders in Cincinnati began to take steps to remedy that impression in order 
to become a favorable trading partner with the New South. The areas of Kentucky 
outside the immediate reach of Louisville and the L & N began to envy the trade and 
prosperity the railroad brought. 30 Historian Robert Wiebe described the change Kentucky 
and the rest of the eastern United States underwent as the breakdown of the "island 
community.,,31 More appropriately applied for the period following Reconstruction, 
nonetheless the desire to bring the farmers and small-scale merchants in rural Kentucky 
closer together with the outside world can be cast in the same light. 
Animosity toward Louisville from the rest of the state was not a new concept in 
1865. Louisville, as a transportation and trading hub, did not look like most other 
Kentucky cities. Because of its commercial importance, Louisville became Kentucky's 
largest city as early as the l820s. Lexington, by comparison, was an interior town which 
did not have access to improved transportation for many years.32 The continual quest for 
29 Curry, Rail Routes South, 11. 
30 Ibid., 17. 
31 Robert H. Wiebe, The Search for Order, 1877-1920 (New York: Hill and Wang, 1967), 18. 
32 One explanation for Henry Clay's adoption of his "American System" of internal improvements was his 
residence in Lexington. Seeing the virtual inaccessibility of the outside world from Lexington, historians 
argued gave Clay the idea to suggest that the federal government involve itself in a scheme of internal 
improvements to aid interior frontier towns such as Lexington. While the American System never was 
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better transportation to and from Lexington inspired Kentucky's first, failed attempt at 
railroad construction and operation mentioned earlier. Some historians characterized the 
anti-Louisville sentiment that arose after the Civil War as a continuation of a jealousy 
towards Louisville's wealth and progress. The exacerbation and continuation of the 
rivalry between Louisville and the Bluegrass Region colored the political environment in 
Kentucky for several decades after 1865. 
Other cities in Kentucky, notably Owensboro and Paducah, mirrored Louisville as 
river towns which relied on trade. Although these cities might have become Louisville's 
allies, such was not the case. Owensboro and Paducah felt the economic dominance of 
the Falls City even in their western Kentucky marketplace.33 
During the same time period and into the 1880s, Louisville politicians wrestled 
with what the city's official role, if any, should be in regard to its ownership of a 
significant portion of L & N stock. The conflict became increasingly important as the L 
& N began its first steps at expansion in the late 1860s to become a system that no longer 
served just Louisville and Nashville, but a railroad network that linked most ofthe Upper 
South?4 The on again, off again conflict between city government and the L & N 
continued throughout the 1870s. What was most important, however, was that both 
implemented in Clay's lifetime, the quest for improved connections with the outside world remained an 
important component of Reconstruction-era Kentucky politics. For the best work on Clay's American 
system, see Maurice G. Baxter, Henry Clay and the American System (Lexington: University Press of 
Kentucky, 1995) and Robert V. Remini, Henry Clay: Statesman/or the Union (New York: W.W. Norton, 
1991). 
33 Lee A. Dew, "Owensboro's Dream of Glory: A Railroad to Russellville," Filson Club History Quarterly 
52 (Winter 1978), 55. 
34 The conflict of whether the L & N should just serve Louisville, or become a larger railroad system fueled 
the almost constant bickering between the Louisville Board of Alderman and the L & N. 
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cooperated to a great extent when both the railroad and the city had similar goals in mind, 
mainly the promotion of Louisville commerce.35 
Before the Civil War, Louisville remained politically aligned with the traditional 
wing of the Democratic Party, which supported slavery. Kentucky, a state divided over 
slavery, was politically divided between the small-scale farmers of eastern Kentucky, 
who opposed slavery and the merchants, farmers, and planters of central and western 
Kentucky who largely supported it. Even with these delineations, it is important to 
remember that the issue of slavery divided Kentucky on a county-by-county basis. Even 
with the large Irish and German immigrant popUlations, Louisville's political reigns were 
tightly in control of the Democratic Party. Like the rest of the state, Louisville 
experienced a brief ascendancy of the Republican Party during the Civil War that quickly 
disappeared after 1865. The political history of Louisville's preference for ex-
Confederates after the war is similar to that of Kentucky itself. 
On a state level, Kentucky remained dominated by the Democratic Party. The 
collapse of the Whig party in 1850s exerted some effect on the state political structure. 
The former Whig elements combined with former Know-Nothings, and Opposition Party 
members formed the new sectional party.36 By the time of the national crisis 1860, the 
dominance of the Democratic Party shifted into a deepening divide between two major 
factions. The first and most powerful faction of the Democrats became known as the 
Union Democrats. These politicians and leaders served an instrumental role in keeping 
35 Curry, Rail Routes South, 22. 
36 Thomas Louis Owen, "The Formative Years of Kentucky's Republican Party, 1864-1871" (Ph.D. diss., 
University of Kentucky, 1981), 24-31. 
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Kentucky in the Union throughout the war. The second and less dominant group, but 
nonetheless vocal, were known as the Southern Rights wing of the party.37 
The numerical inferiority of the Republican Party in Kentucky during the war did 
not cool the political passions of the era. Republicans combined with a strong vote block 
of Union Democrats held the governorship from 1862 to 1867, while they lost the state 
legislature in 1865.38 The cooperation was short lived because in 1864, both the Union 
and Southern rights wing of the party sent separate delegations to the convention in 
Chicago.39 While at the convention, both sides fused and helped select McClellan as the 
Democratic candidate for the presidency. The 1864 election signaled the end of 
Republican and Union Democrat cooperation and thus began the rise of a form of neo-
Confederatism in Kentucky politics. 
The national political system in the mid-1860s forced Kentucky politicians to 
rethink their electoral strategies. The transformation began in 1864 when the newly-
fused elements of the Democratic Party came from behind and won a crucial appellate 
judgeship race. Later in November, anti-Union sentiment rose to such a peak that in 
statewide polling, McClellan beat Lincoln by nearly 40,000 votes.40 The rise of the 
Democratic Party furthered itself in 1865 when the party took control of both houses of 
the General Assembly. The capstone to the reemergence ofthe Kentucky Democratic 
Party came in 1867 when the party captured the Governor's race. John L. Helm, the 
father of Confederate Brigadier General Ben Hardin Helm received the Democratic Party 
37 Hambleton Tapp and James C. Klotter, Kentucky: Decades of Discord, 1865-1900 (Frankfort: Kentucky 
Historical Society, 1977), 10-13. 
38 Owen, 45. 
39 Tapp and Klotter, Decades of Discord, 14. 
40 Stefan Lorant, The Glorious Burden: The American Presidency (New York: Harper Collins, 1968),915. 
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nomination for Governor with John W. Stevenson nominated for Lieutenant Governor.41 
A small faction of Union Democrats, dismayed at the possibility of prominent ex-
Confederates rising to power in state government, held their own convention and 
nominated their own slate.42 The Republicans, identified with the radical wing ofthe 
party that controlled Congress, received little electoral support for their nominee Sidney 
M. Bames.43 The statewide election in August revealed a complete victory for the 
Democratic Party. Helm received a majority 56, 286 votes over the two other candidates. 
A Union newspaper editor, upset over the Democratic victory, declared "Kentucky failed 
to secede in 1861. By a strange conjunction of circumstances what the rebels failed to do 
that year, they freely realized in the year 1867.,,44 
The political change in Kentucky, however, was not a coincidence or even a 
delayed vote in support of secession. The Democratic Party domination in Kentucky 
came as a result of three main factors. First, even though 90,000 Kentuckians severed for 
the Union, three times the number of Kentuckians who served in the Confederacy, 
dissatisfaction for both the Lincoln administration and the continued occupation of 
Kentucky by Union forces grew.45 Second, a growing rumor of Congressional 
Reconstruction for Kentucky, followed by comments by Charles Sumner of 
Massachusetts, received little praise from citizens of the Commonwealth. Sumner wrote 
a letter to Brigadier General James S. Brisbin, a Union commander in Lexington, 
"Nothing can be more certain than that Kentucky at this time is without a republican form 
41 Tapp and Klotter, Decades 0/ Discord, 19-22. 
42 Ibid., 22. 
43 Owen, 48. 
44 "How Kentucky Left the Union," Cincinnati Weekly Gazette, 27 March 1868. 
45 McDowell, City o/Conflict, 188. 
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of govemment.,,46 Third, even though Louisville and Kentucky declared neutrality 
during the early part of the Civil War, the post war political and economic future of 
Kentucky lay in the South. As a result, even former pro-Union Kentuckians decided 
against continuing an affiliation with both the Union Democrats and the RepUblicans, and 
switched their loyalty to prominent ex-Confederate leaders. The switch to ex-
Confederates preceded a similar move by other southern states after the end of 
Reconstruction in 1877. With no significant occupying Union forces in Kentucky, the 
Republican Party could not hold on to, or even attain statewide or federal office after the 
war. As a result, the victors became ruled by the vanquished. Republicans and Union 
Democrats failed to tum battlefield victories into lasting political ones in Kentucky. The 
failure to do so shaped Kentucky politics for the remainder of the century. 
Although the Democratic Party remained dominant in Kentucky following the end 
of the Civil War, a new factionalism developed. While factionalism seldom split the 
party vote, the leading voices in opposition of ex-Confederate rule eventually changed 
the way the Democratic Party functioned in Louisville and in Kentucky as a whole. 
Following the southern trend, the early 1870s brought a new faction to Kentucky politics. 
The new faction, called the New Departure, a wing of the Democratic Party, realized that 
a return to the Antebellum world for the South was impossible.47 Instead, the future of 
the South lay in industry, improved transportation, and education. The leader of the New 
Departure wing of the party in Kentucky was an ex-Confederate himself, Henry 
Watterson, the editor of the state's largest newspaper, The Louisville Courirer-Journal. 
In the years following the war, Watterson used his experiences and extensive travels 
46 Tapp and Klotter, Decades of Discord, 17. 
47 Tapp and Klotter, Decades of Discord, 19. 
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throughout the United States to view the beginnings of industrialization and 
modernization in America.48 He became concerned with the beginnings of rapid 
industrial and commercial progress that started to sweep the northern states. 
Realizing the economic importance of Louisville to developing a new South, 
Watterson used his pen to promote the ideals of the New Departure. Knowing that 
slavery would never return and that Kentucky's as well as Louisville's future lay in 
progress, not in the past, Watterson helped make Louisville the center of New Departure 
thinking. Many citizens, business leaders, and especially the investors and officers of the 
L & N railroad welcomed New Departure thinking.49 In particular, business leaders in 
Louisville welcomed the possibility of increased population, industrial growth, and 
construction of more railroad lines into the city. These leaders had close interaction with 
and viewed the economic prosperity of the states north of the Ohio River with some envy. 
If Louisville became the center of New Departure thinking, the Bluegrass Region 
of Kentucky became the natural center for the traditional wing of the Democratic Party, 
known as the Bourbons. The Bourbons adopted one fundamental platform or principle. 
Service in the Confederate Army or Navy was the one and only test for candidacy. 50 The 
Bourbons felt that ex-Confederates should maintain control of the Democratic Party and 
opposed any intrusion of the national government into Kentucky affairs. 51 Centered on 
prominent plantation owners, attorneys and newspaper editors, the Bourbons adopted the 
premise of the "Lost Cause," and a refusal to accept the reality of Lee's surrender at 
48 Henry Watterson, Marse Henry, An Autobiography (New York: Beekman Publishers, 1974),48. 
49 Tapp and Klotter, Decades of Discord, 32. 
50 Watterson, Marse Henry, 67. 
51 Some of the Bourbons violated this principle when during the fight for the Cincinnati Southern, they 
appealed to the Congress and President Grant for federal assistance in funding the project. 
65 
Appomattox.52 Fearful of industry and any large-scale commercial activity, the Bourbons 
eyed Louisville and the New Departure wing of the Democratic Party with suspicion.53 
Located in Kentucky's rich agricultural heartland, Bourbons felt that agriculture was the 
key to Kentucky's future. Expressing no interest in public education or in the expansion 
of improved transportation, the Bourbons became increasingly hostile to the idea of 
suffrage for recently freed slaves. 54 Appalled at the direction of national politics, the 
Bourbon wing of the Democratic Party lived in the past of an agricultural, plantation-
based economy, an Antebellum economy that never would return to Kentucky. To the 
Bourbons, however, they took proactive steps in an attempt to put Kentucky where the 
state could never go, back into the past. 
With the political battle lines drawn, Louisville business and political leaders 
began to reconnect with southern trade after the Civil War. The period from 1865 to 
1872, however, was marked by some complacency from Louisville in regard to 
expansion of transportation, notably railroads into the deeper South. Most of the effort of 
the era concentrated on two major tasks. First, Louisville business and political leaders 
began to promote Louisville as a southern city, friendly to southern trade. Second, those 
same leaders began to fight against the threat of Cincinnati constructing a railroad into 
the interior of central Kentucky southward, forming another artery of commerce into the 
South. Louisville was in an envious position as a dominant location for southern trade. 
52 Service to the Confederacy became such a powerful test for public office that some low-level city and 
county officials claimed Confederate service while actually serving with the Union. 
53 While the New Departure and the Bourbon wing never officially split during the l860s and 1870s the 
tension between the two factions led to several major propaganda wars. 
S4 In defeating ratification of the Thirteenth Amendment to the Constitution, prominent Bourbons stated 
that the Amendment violated Lincoln's 1861 promise to not affect slavery in the southern states, which 
conveniently forgot the Emancipation Proclamation, or much of Lincoln's policy from 1862 onward. 
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The pro-southern business propaganda from Louisville in the 1860s and 1870s 
expressed Louisville's new direction in commerce promotion. In particular the Louisville 
Board of Trade concentrated much effort on making Louisville an appealing location to 
purchase goods. The minutes of the board of trade often contained material quoted from 
various southern newspapers. On such newspaper, the Memphis Bulletin stated, "They 
[Louisvillians] have an elegant and refined society here, and as 1 learn thoroughly 
Southern in prejudice ... ,,55 The clipping went on to state, "I have seen a number of 
returned Confederates here. They are all doing well.,,56 The writer could not have 
crafted a more letter perfect advertisement for those interested in promoting Louisville 
trade and business. The message of the Memphis Bulletin focused on the two key 
messages Louisville promoted to the South. First, the Louisville Board of Trade 
expended much effort in emphasizing that Louisville was a southern city, despite its 
loyalty to the Union during the Civil War. 57 Second, prosperous former Confederates 
could be found in Louisville, another indication of how successful Louisville was as a 
southern city. 
Central to the promotion of Louisville as a center of southern trade was the 
Louisville and Nashville Railroad. While before completion of the L & N, Louisville 
relied on steamboats to provide trade with the South, between 1865 and 1868 river trade 
to the South accounted for less than 14 percent of the total river trade in Louisville.58 A 
majority of goods shipped via the Ohio River were bound for ports north of Louisville or 
the western rivers. The importance of southern trade for the L & N resulted in an almost 
55 Minutes of the Louisville Board of Trade, 11 May 1865, Chamber of Commerce Collection, 1862-1920, 
University of Louisville Archives. Hereafter cited as Trade Minutes. 
56 Ibid. 
57 Curry, Rail Routes South, 44. 
58 Ibid., 30. 
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one-way transportation of freight south from Louisville by the railroads. In the fiscal 
year of 1869-1870, the L & N shipped over three times as many goods southward as it 
shipped north to Louisville.59 As the decade came to a close, many in Louisville realized 
that the future lay in the L & N railroad. If the city was to retain its preeminent role as 
the supplier for the South, the business interests and the railroad would have to reach 
some sort of cooperation in order to effectively promote trade with Louisville. Even 
though the steamboat interests fought hard against the railroad, the iron horse won out 
with its speed and economy. 
Beginning in 1865 and culminating in 1867, the Louisville Board of Trade 
lobbied the L & N to reach special rate agreements, giving long distance southern 
customers rate preferences in southbound shipments from Louisville.60 Another 
innovation of the era, pooling, allowed railroads to combine resources in order to 
expedite shipment of goods. On January 1, 1868, the L & N along with the Western and 
Atlantic Railroad, the Nashville and Northwestern Railroad, and the Nashville and 
Chattanooga Railroad, reached a special pooling agreement. Named the "Green Line," 
the partnership between the four railroads entailed each line providing a specified number 
of dedicated freight cars for the service.61 At a fixed rate of one and one half cents per 
mile, freight loaded into the specially painted green freight cars in Louisville.62 The 
sealed cargo then traveled as far as Montgomery, Alabama and Augusta, Georgia before 
being unloaded. The special service, with its fixed rates, proved attractive to southern 
S9 Henry V. Poor, ed., Poor's Manual of Railroads 1869-1870 (New York: Poor Manual Company, 1870), 
344. 
60 Stover, Railroads of the South, 150-151. 
61 Curry, Rail Routes South, 32. 
62 Klein, History of the Louisville and Nashville Railroad, 76-78. 
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merchants looking for faster transportation into the markets of the Deep South states. 63 
One of the key figures in the push to organize the Green Line was Milton H. Smith, later 
president ofthe L & N.64 
Desiring to cover all fronts in an offensive strategy to promote Louisville Trade, 
the Louisville Board of Trade reached several agreements with steamboat lines. While 
the steamboat could not compete against the economy and speed of rail transportation, 
several steam boat packet lines served areas not yet connected to Louisville via rail, 
notably the settlements along the western rivers in Arkansas.65 Signing agreements with 
Pink Varble and William J. May, the owners of two major western river packet lines, the 
Louisville Board of Trade contracted departures three days a week from Louisville into 
the Arkansas and Tennessee River systems.66 The establishment of these contracted runs 
allowed Louisville trade to make inroads into areas previously dominated by New 
Orleans and St. Louis merchants.67 While smaller than those two cities, Louisville 
merchants used the available transportation resources to advance the cause of Louisville 
trade. 
While most think of the steamboat and railroad working against each other in 
competition in the late 1860s, the Louisville Board of Trade also decided to pursue a 
partnership between the two to provide increased trade opportunities for products shipped 
from Louisville. In July 1868, the board along with the L & N established joining packet, 
63 Ely, Railroads and American Law, 82-83. 
64 Milton H. Smith a native of New York who worked for the U.S. Military Railroads during the Civil War 
was the chief Freight Agent for the L & N and was responsible for the success of the Green Line, which 
lasted for just over fifteen years. Smith's later ascendancy to the presidency of the L & N marked the 
culmination of the road's dominance in Kentucky politics and southern trade. Smith's leadership of the L 
& N later proved instrumental in finding a number of prominent New York investors to take control over 
the line after the Louisville Board of Alderman decided to sell its stock in the L & N in 1880. 
65 Curry, Rail Routes South, 34. 
66 Trade Minutes, 26 July, 12 August, 1867. 
67 Trade Minutes, 22, April 1867. 
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railroad service between Louisville and Paducah, Kentucky, and Florence Alabama.68 
The agreement signaled a change in the way riverboats functioned. No longer utilizing 
the palatial steamers along the main rivers, river packet lines found a niche market 
serving as feeders to rail transportation in the South through the navigation of feeder river 
systems on the Tennessee, Cumberland, and Ohio rivers.69 
Also during the same period, Louisville commercial interests and the L & N 
pushed for better connections with the North. As Louisville remained a trade based not a 
manufacturing based city, business leaders recognized the importance of better 
connections with the North. No bridge connected Louisville with Indiana. Several 
railroads terminated at New Albany with no direct connection with the L & N.7o In mid-
1866 surveys took place for a new bridge to connect Louisville with Jeffersonville, 
Indiana.71 Business interests in rival city Cincinnati bitterly opposed the construction of 
the bridge. The opposition claimed that such a bridge, if constructed would be a 
navigational hazard to river traffic. At almost all stages of water, the railroad bridge in 
Louisville would be nine to ten feet higher above the water than Cincinnati's own 
suspension bridge.72 Five Ohio Falls river pilots signed an affidavit stating that the 
bridge, as planed, would not constitute an obstruction to river traffic on the Ohio River. 
The possible motivation behind Cincinnati's opposition to the construction of such a 
bridge was that the Ohio River no longer served as a barrier with Indiana and other 
northern markets.73 In the period after 1865, Cincinnati dominated the trade in southern 
68 Trade Minutes, 10 July 1868. 
69 Klein, History of the Louisville and Nashville Railroad, 40. 
70 Ibid., 44. 
71 Louisville Bridge Company Annual Reportfor the Year 1867 (Louisville, KY.: John P. Morton, 1868), 
14-19. 
72 Curry, Rail Routes South, 52. 
73 Ibid., 52-53. 
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Indiana and into southern Illinois. Any move by Louisville to provide improved 
transportation to the area was seen as usurpation by Louisville interests into Cincinnati's 
trade territory. With no real opposition, the construction of the Louisville Bridge began 
on August 1, 1867.74 
In addition to connecting Louisville with Indiana, work began in early 1866 on a 
railroad to connect La Grange with Covington. The Louisville and Cincinnati Railroad, 
heavily supported by both Louisville area merchants and the L & N, was to serve an 
important role in the expansion of Louisville trade.75 Like the bridge to Indiana, the 
Louisville and Cincinnati railroad provided a direct route for manufacturers to ship goods 
to Louisville. Just as before the Civil War, Louisville was not a major manufacturing 
city. Louisville was, however, a major location for merchants and commerce acting as 
middleman for manufactured goods.76 Despite calls for more manufacturing in 
Louisville, the city remained a distribution center for goods headed to southern markets. 
As a result, members of the Board of Trade realized that manufacturing centers such as 
Indianapolis, Cincinnati, and Chicago needed better transportation to Louisville in order 
for the Falls City to remain competitive for southern trade. 
In addition, by routing Cincinnati goods through Louisville along with the use of 
preferential freight rates and car pooling, it was hoped that the L & N could bottleneck 
freight from Cincinnati in Louisville by slowing the time it took to transfer the freight 
into L & N freight cars. The delay gave Louisville merchants a greater advantage.77 In 
74 Ibid., 53. Some minor opposition to the bridge formed when plans were flrst announced, but support for 
the project quickly grew. 
75 Klein, History of the Louisville and Nashville Railroad, 95. 
76 The lack of manufacturing in Louisville concerned some in the business community. Seeing 
manufacturing as part of a solid future economy, local leaders began to lobby for more manufacturing in 
the city. The manufacturing boom hit Louisville during the mid to late 1870s. 
77 The L & N gave Louisville-based traffic rate preferences. 
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1866, the L & N did not directly connect with the Louisville and Frankfort. Any freight 
originating in Cincinnati and headed to southern markets had to be broken from bulk and 
transported through the streets of Louisville in order to reach the L & N.78 The expensive 
and time consuming process placed Louisville originated goods at an advantage.79 Any 
manufactured goods bound for Louisville merchants had to be offloaded anyway, so 
Louisville reaped an advantage by connecting by rail, albeit not directly, with Cincinnati. 
The late 1860s found Louisville merchants at a great advantage for southern trade. 
In addition to the L & N's prominence as a direct trade route with the South, Louisville 
merchants through the Board of Trade, took steps to use river and rail transportation, 
special rates and railroad freight car pooling to enhance Louisville's role as a trading and 
commerce center. The expansion of Louisville's prominent role as a southern trade 
center marked a central role of New Departure Democratic Party politics. The "New 
South" that prominent New Departure leaders such as Henry Watterson envisioned used 
trade connections with the North, and improved transportation into the South as keys to 
southern prosperity. so As the rivalry with Cincinnati intensified, however, Queen City 
leaders were eager to use the Bourbon faction against the New Departure Democrats in a 
bid to break Louisville's trade monopoly. While most Louisvillians probably viewed the 
L & N as beneficial to the Commonwealth, those in rural areas sometimes felt 
discriminated against by the railroad. The ensuing battle over Cincinnati's response to 
Louisville trade domination pitted urban against rural, the New Departure against the 
78 Hines, Corporate History of the L & N, 47. 
79 The L & N used its stockholdings in the Louisville and Cincinnati to give Louisville commerce 
preference. When the two railroads did build an interchange, just south of the House of Redemption, the L 
& N forced the other railroad to change its gauge to 4'8 Yz". The L & N used a 5' gauge at the time, and by 
forcing the other railroad to adopt a dissimilar gauge, it forced all freight originating from Cincinnati to 
break bulk. 
80 Watterson, Marse Henry, 78-83. 
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Bourbon Democrats, in a significant economic and political battle for Louisville's future 
as the king of southern trade. 
The commercial rivalry between Louisville and Cincinnati reached a flashpoint 
between 1869 and 1872. During that time, the backers of a new railroad project 
attempted three times to secure a charter from the Kentucky General Assembly to 
construct a railroad through Kentucky from Cincinnati to Chattanooga. The legislative 
and political battles consumed the commercial interests of both Louisville and Cincinnati 
and focused much attention on major political figures of the era. Despite failing twice, 
the backers ofthe railroad from Cincinnati succeeded in convincing the General 
Assembly, despite the powerful L & N lobby, that the rail road needed to be chartered. 
Key to the political battle between Louisville and Cincinnati was the political 
alignment of Kentucky during the era. Louisville, as home of the New Departure faction 
of the Democratic Party, wished to expand transportation from Louisville in order to 
enhance the commercial prospects of the Falls City. The Bourbons became more focused 
on the needs of the small farming communities of central Kentucky and their lack of 
adequate access to commercial markets, such as Louisville and Cincinnati. In a 
psychological sense, Cincinnati had to win over the Bourbon faction of the Democratic 
Party and thus legislative support for any railroad project. In the late 1860s many viewed 
Cincinnati as a hotbed of the Radical Republican party.81 The image was only 
exacerbated when news of Robert E. Lee's death in 1870 caused Cincinnati newspapers 
to describe the general as a "traitor.,,82 Unlike Louisville, where businesses closed as a 
sign of respect, Cincinnati merchants remained open for business. The episode created 
81 Curry, Rail Routes South, 37. 
82 "Louisville Mourns General's Death," The Louisville Courier-Journal, 14 October 1870, sec 1. 
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much negative publicity for the Queen City and highlighted the difficulties Cincinnati 
faced in gaining Bourbon Democrat support for the Cincinnati Southern Railway. 
The first obstacle that the merchants of Cincinnati overcame centered on the 
skirting of Ohio law which prohibited civic investment in railroads.83 By creating what 
amounted to a dummy corporation to manage the investments into the railroad, the city 
government of Cincinnati effectively evaded Ohio law against such activity. The project, 
known as the Cincinnati Southern Railway, would connect Cincinnati with Chattanooga, 
thus providing the Queen city with a direct trade conduit into the south, a route that 
rivaled the L & N for trade dominance. 
The battle for chartering the Cincinnati Southern took place over three 
consecutive sessions of the Kentucky General Assembly between 1869 and 1872.84 The 
legislative and political battle demonstrated how far the merchant community of 
Louisville would go to maintain its commercial monopoly on southern trade. In order to 
keep the Louisville railroad and trade monopoly secure, both the L & N and the 
Louisville Board of Trade decided on a course of action which appealed to the Bourbon 
faction of the Democratic Party. The first and most important step in courting the 
General Assembly was the hiring of a lobbyist to promote the shared interests ofthe L & 
N and Louisville. The L & N already had Basil W. Duke on the company payroll. Duke, 
an ex-Confederate General brother in law to John Hunt Morgan and his successor in 
command, moved to Louisville after the war and became a member of the General 
83 William G. Thomas, Lawyeringfor the Railroad: Business, Law, and Power in the New South (Baton 
Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1999),58. 
84 Leonard Curry did an excellent job of describing each of the three separate legislative battles over the 
Cincinnati Southern in Rail Routes South. For the purposes of this paper though, only important highlights 
covering the railroad-political aspects will be examined. 
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Assembly.85 A prominent member of the community, Duke first aided the L & N and 
Louisville commercial interests as a community leader. What was most amazing about 
Duke's new job was that during the Civil War, Duke along with Morgan's raiders made a 
career of smashing up the L & N and burning railroad bridges throughout Kentucky. 86 
Sitting as Chairman of the powerful House Committee on Railroads, Duke spearheaded 
opposition to the Cincinnati Southern bill during the first failed attempt to attain a charter 
for the railroad. 
The choice of Duke to represent the Louisville interests was a master stroke of 
political genius on the part of the Louisville interests. Duke was not only well known, 
but possessed excellent oratorical skills and a mind fit for manipulating the legislative 
process. Duke's services to the L & N continued for many years, his powerful name as a 
member of Morgan's Raiders carried a high level of prestige with legislators in 
Frankfort.87 Duke's power and prestige, however, would be countered successfully by 
the Cincinnati interests. 
Realizing the propaganda power of Louisville with their choice of Basil W. Duke 
as the lobbyist for the L & N, leaders in Cincinnati realized they needed to counter with a 
bigger name. Also, the psychological image of Cincinnati as a northern city must have 
come into playas the backers of the Cincinnati Southern chose someone with impeccable 
Confederate credentials. In December 1869, General John C. Breckinridge, a prominent 
85 Klein, History of the Louisville and Nashville Railroad, 107. 
86 Basil W. Duke, Reminiscences o/General Basil W. Duke (Garden City, NY.: Doubleday, Page, and 
Company, 1911), 125. 
87 Thomas, Lawyering for the Railroad, 56. 
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Kentuckian, United States Senator, and former Cabinet official, announced that he would 
promote the passage of the Cincinnati Southern legislation.88 
Between 1869 and 1872, Duke and Breckinridge engaged in a political struggle of 
titanic proportions. Both Duke and Breckinridge served for the Confederacy and after the 
war represented interests that supported the Union during the Civil War. In the end, 
Duke and the Louisville supporters held off the Breckinridge camp twice, requiring the 
expenditure of valuable political capital. The main tactic that Breckinridge and his 
supporters used was to move the focus of the debate away from Louisville and 
Cincinnati. The less the Cincinnati backers lobbied in Frankfort, the better. Instead, 
Breckinridge turned the debate into one about Louisville unfairly dominating the state, 
and the unfair political influence the L & N exerted in Frankfort. 
The turning point in favor of Cincinnati not only came from direct lobbying but 
also through the electoral process. The election of 1871 furthered the grip of the Bourbon 
Democrats on the General Assembly.89 Many supporters of the Cincinnati Southern won 
elections in their home districts, running on a platform to "keep Louisville in its place," 
and came to Frankfort to secure passage of the bill authorizing construction of the line. 
The remaining legislators were sufficiently lobbied by the Cincinnati Southern interests 
as to the benefits of the proposed road. The L & N, they successfully argued, only served 
Louisville with a disregard to a majority of the Commonwealth. Cities such as 
Covington and Lexington, as well as the smaller towns and agricultural areas of the 
central portion of the state, would stand to benefit from a program of railroad 
construction in the Bluegrass Region. As a result of electoral and legislative 
88 Curry, Rail Routes South, 77. 
89 Tapp and Klotter, Decades of Discord, 39. 
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maneuvering, the bill authorizing the charter of the Cincinnati Southern received 
Governor Preston Leslie's signature on February 13, 1872.90 After several years and 
countless dollars spent opposing a competing trade route south, Louisville and the L & N 
lost their monopoly that day. While it took nearly ten years to finish the Cincinnati 
Southern, Bourbon Democracy once again triumphed in Kentucky. 
Despite the eventual loss to Cincinnati, Louisville remained an important artery of 
trade to the South. Of equal importance, the city once characterized as being neither 
northern nor southern, came to a distinct identity. The end of the Civil War and the 
resulting political and economic shifts resulted in Louisville establishing a southern 
identity. The use of prominent ex-Confederates such as Basil W. Duke to promote 
Louisville interests highlighted the change. For the business and political leaders of 
Louisville, the adoption of a southern identity proved to be an easy choice. Realizing the 
direction the Bourbon Democrats took Kentucky politics, the New Departure Democrats 
realized the importance of the adoption of a southern identity. 
The battle for the Cincinnati Southern was not the zenith of railroad involvement 
in Kentucky politics, it just heralded the beginning of a new phase. Recognition of the 
importance of the General Assembly in shaping public policy towards railroads forced 
many in Louisville, including the stockholders of the L & N, to take proactive political 
steps to protect the economic interests of the railroad. The zeal in which the L & N 
lobbied against the Cincinnati Southern only signaled the beginning of overt involvement 
in politics by the L & N.91 As the 1870s progressed, significant changes occurred in 
Louisville in relation to business and the political process. The love-hate relationship 
90 Curry, Rail Routes South, 136. 
91 Klein, History o/the Louisville and Nashville Railroad, 368-369. 
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between the Board of Alderman and the L & N finally reached a boiling point in the late 
1870s resulting in the sale ofL & N stock by the board in 1880. New Yorkers took 
control of the line with the purchase of the Alderman's stock but the control and 
operation of the L & N remained in Louisville hands. Milton H. Smith, the freight agent 
who helped organize the Green Line in 1868, ascended to the presidency of the L & N in 
1884 serving in the position to his death. Smith and New York investors helped fashion 
the L & N into more than just a railroad that served business interests in Louisville. The 
L & N became, through massive expansion throughout the 1870s and 1880s, one of the 
premier railroads in the South, if not the most important. 
Louisville remained an important commercial center throughout the nineteenth 
century. The emergence of the Industrial Revolution in the 1870s brought more industry 
to Louisville to supplement the commercial interests. Henry Watterson, as editor of The 
Courier-Journal, remained a strong advocate of the New Departure, a philosophy that 
took hold later in the century. While Louisville lost out to Bourbon Democracy in 1872, 
the realization that the future of Louisville and Kentucky lay both in the New Departure 
and in the Bourbon past, continued to reverberate throughout the state. Louisville 
became a city of the South. 
78 
CHAPTER FOUR 
THE OCTUPUS AND THE KENTON KING: REGIONAL GROWTH AND STATE 
REGULATION, 1872-1900. 
The failure by the Louisville and Nashville Railroad and its supporters to halt the 
Kentucky legislature from chartering the Cincinnati Southern project in 1872 marked a 
period of transformation in Kentucky railroad history and Kentucky political history. 
The immense political pressure the L & N could muster worried many in Kentucky. The 
use oflobbying, combined with the shift of ownership of the L & N to forces outside 
Kentucky, added to the railroad's negative public image. By the end of the nineteenth 
century, state courts and state legislatures, as well as the federal Congress, no longer used 
their power to promote the growth of the railroad industry. Regulation replaced 
promotion in a culture that viewed railroads as dangerous monopolies, or to use the 
popular terminology of the day, an octopus that strangled average Americans, especially 
small farmers and businessmen. 
Despite the setback of loosing the battle against Cincinnati for a southern trade 
monopoly, the L & N employed a strategy of continual expansion throughout the rest of 
the nineteenth century.l The financial prosperity enjoyed by the L & N in the late 1860s 
and early 1870s provided much needed reserve capital to rebuild infrastructure worn thin 
by wartime use. Based on its solid financial condition, the L & N began the process of 
I Leonard P. Curry, Rail Routes South: Louisville's Fight/or the Southern Market, 1865-1872 (Lexington: 
University of Kentucky Press, 1969), 138-139. 
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expansion through acquisition? By 1881, the year in which control ofthe railroad came 
under the finn hands of New York-based interests, the L & N stretched from Louisville to 
New Orleans with subsidiary lines serving Chattanooga, Memphis, and Cincinnati.3 
The 1870s, however, were not all good for the L & N, due in large measure to the 
economic problems of the period. One result of the panic of 1873 was that Kentucky 
farmers, many of whom the panic financially ruined, looked for a scapegoat.4 In 
searching for a target, one industry, the railroads, became the primary focus of the 
angered farmers.s Railroads, with rate policies that favored long-haul traffic and the 
pooling of cars freight cars for long distance shipment, appeared to be the CUlprit that led 
to the financial ruin of many in the United States. The most prosperous railroad in 
Kentucky, the L & N, faced much of this anger throughout the rest of the nineteenth 
century. The period from 1872 to 1900 contained four phases in the political and legal 
history of railroads in Kentucky. First, the expansion of both the L & Nand of other 
railroads into Kentucky continued throughout the decade. As railroad mileage in the 
United States grew throughout the 1870s and 1880s, railroads consolidated and local 
influence and ownership diminished.6 The second phase included early attempts by the 
Kentucky Legislature to reign in the railroads through the first Kentucky Railroad 
Commission. The attempt, following a nation-wide pattern, reflected a change in public 
policy in Kentucky and the United States. No longer did courts and legislatures use the 
law to foster and promote railroad development. Much of the legislation of the 1870s and 
2 John F. Stover, The Railroads of the South, 1865-1900: A Study in Finance and Control (Chapel Hill: 
University of North Carolina Press, 1955),230-232. 
3 Between 1872 and 1900 the L & N grew from a 616 mile system to a 3,007 mile system. 
4 Hambleton Tapp, and James C. Klotter, Kentucky: Decades of Discord, 1865-1900 (Frankfort: Kentucky 
Historical Society, 1977), 141-143. 
5 Clarence B. Carson, Throttling the Railroads (Indianapolis, IN.: Liberty Fund, 1971),43-50. 
6 Stover, Railroads of the South, 270-275. 
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throughout the rest ofthe nineteenth century focused on reigning in the industry.7 The 
railroads themselves, at the height of their political influence and power, believed the 
infusion of more money and railroad pressure into the political system would attain a 
political victory for the industry. The result was quite the opposite. The more the L & N 
poured money into state elections, the more vilified the company became in political and 
popular culture. 
The rise of agrarian-populist influence in Kentucky politics marked the third 
phase of railroad and political history of the era. Much like the rise of farmer's unions, 
such as the Grange in the Midwest, agrarians in Kentucky combined forces with Bourbon 
Democrats kept Kentucky out of the industrial age for many years.8 The end result ofthe 
agrarian uprising in the United States throughout the 1880s and 1890s resulted in a 
Democratic Party that fractured over the candidacy of William Jennings Bryan and his 
free silver platform.9 The fourth and final phase of the period concerned the rise of 
William Goebel in Kentucky politics and his attempts to unite the Democratic Party 
against a common enemy -- Milton H. Smith and the L & N railroad. His ascension, 
election, and assassination ended the overt political involvement by the L & N or any 
other railroad in Kentucky's politics. 
Even though the L & N lost the battle to prevent the Kentucky legislature from 
chartering the Cincinnati Southern Railway in 1872, the company continued to prosper. 
Taking advantage of the fact that backers of the Cincinnati railroad had yet to construct 
7 James Willard Hurst, Law and Economic Growth: The Legal History of the Lumber Industry in 
Wisconsin, 1836-1915 (Cambridge, MA.: Belknap, 1964),277. 
8 Tapp and Klotter, Decades of Discord, 127-139. 
9 McKinley won Kentucky's electoral votes in 1896. For a study on the election, see Robert C. McMath, 
American Populism: A Social History, 1877-1898 (New York: Hill and Wang, 1993); Robert C. McMath, 
Populist Vanguard: A History of the Southern Farmers Alliance (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina 
Press, 1975) ; Stanley L. Jones, The Presidential Election of 1896 (Madison: University of Wisconsin 
Press, 1964); and Paul W. Glad, McKinley, Bryan, and the People (Philadelphia, PA.: Lippincott, 1964). 
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their line to Chattanooga, the L & N consolidated their operations, and extended 
company influence throughout the upper South. lO The most notable acquisition of the era 
was the 1873 buyout of the Nashville, Chattanooga and st. Louis Railroad Company, the 
N. C. & St. L. ll The company, based in Nashville, operated a railroad from Memphis to 
Chattanooga with a route extending into far-western Kentucky. The acquisition of the N. 
C. & st. L. gave the L & N direct access to Chattanooga eight years before the 
completion of the Cincinnati Southern project. 12 In 1865, the L & N owned and operated 
some 300 miles of railroad. The main stem, the line from Louisville to Nashville, totaled 
185 miles.13 In addition, the L & N operated three branchlines to Bardstown, Lebanon, 
and the Tennessee state line respectively. The acquisition of the N. C. & St. L. in 1873 
combined with the purchase of several smaller railroads in northern Alabama allowed the 
L & N to become more than just a railroad which served Louisville, but a railroad that 
served the entire upper South. By 1872, the L & N owned more than 616 miles of track 
as the result ofthe aggressive expansion and purchasing policies of the railroad's new 
president, H. D. Newcomb. 14 
Newcomb outlined the company's strategy of purchasing smaller railroads, 
especially in northern Alabama, in the 1873 annual report. Newcomb stated: 
10 Curry, Rail Routes South, 139. The construction of the Cincinnati Southern lasted until 1881. 
11 Maury Klein, History of the Louisville and Nashville Railroad (New York: Macmillan, 1972), 139. 
12 James D. B. DeBow, Legal History of the Entire System of the Nashville, Chattanooga, 
and St. Louis Railway and Possessions: Including and Discussing the Charters, Amendments, Rights, 
Privileges, and Franchises o/Main Stem and Branches; By-Laws, Mortgages, Abstract o/Title to Every 
Branch Acquired, Showing Width of Right 0/ Way, Distance Built, Deeds or Leases to, and Mortgages on 
Same; Laws and Decisions Relating to Right o/Way, Internal Organization, Meetings, etc., as Well as 
General Powers in Alabama, Georgia, Kentucky, and Tennessee (Nashville, TN.: Marshall and Bruce Co., 
1900),28. 
\3 Klein, History of the Louisville and Nashville Railroad, 530. 
14 H. D. Newcomb, a wealthy Louisville attorney and investor was a personal friend of James Guthrie, the 
chief Louisville supporter of the Louisville and Nashville railroad. 
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The location of this line [in nortlilern Alabama] is such that this Company can 
never be excluded from the bus it cess of the Southeast and Southwest, from which 
it might have been cut off at any time at the pleasure of rival interests, which have 
been and which are still being bu ilt up. IS 
Newcomb and the directors of the L & N realized that like the battle with Cincinnati, 
which hinged on the Queen City having access by rail to markets in the South, the L & 
N's future centered on the ability to own direct access to the South.16 
The costs associated with purchasing other railroads and building new rail lines 
added up for the L & N. Throughout thc:: 1870s, the L & N faced tough financial 
situations as a result of the aggressive expansion policy of Newcomb. 17 The crisis, while 
it did not seriously damage the L & N in financial terms, created strained relations with 
the company's investors, including the City of Louisville. The L & N remained 
profitable throughout the early part of 1 f' 73 until mid June. Disease epidemics in the 
cities which the L & N served, combined with the then-rare occurrence of the Ohio and 
Mississippi Rivers being navigable all ~!ar, led to a severe business slowdown for the 
railroad. The siphoning off of business by the steam boats forced the L & N to cut rates 
which led to lower profits for the company. Difficulties continued into 1874 when floods 
in western Tennessee and crop failures illl Alabama added more pressure on the L & N to 
remain solvent. 18 The credit rating ofth,;: L & N remained strong before the national 
economic trouble began, which placed the company in a better footing than other 
businesses ruined by the 1873 panic. 19 Still, as cash flow problems arose, Newcomb 
scrambled to keep the railroad solvent by cutting costs. In addition to attempting to save 
15 Annual Report of the President and Directors 'Jf the Louisville & Nashville Railroad Company 
(Louisville, KY.: J. P. Morton, 1873), 10-11. 
16 One reason the L & N extended into Alabama was to tap the region's large iron ore deposits. 
17 Klein, History of the Louisville and Nashville Railroad, 148. 
18 Edward W. Hines, Corporate History of the Lmisville and Nashville Railroad and Roads in Its System 
(Louisville, KY.: J. P. Morton Company, 1905),58. 
19 Ibid, 60-62. 
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money, Newcomb investigated several plans to refinance the L & N's bond situation, 
giving the company more money in which to stay afloat with.20 Natural disasters, disease 
outbreaks, a worsening debt situation, and the problem of stagnating business allIed the 
L & N down the path to potential ruin. Only through the emergency sale of bonds to 
Baring Brothers in London did the company successfully weather the storm. Still, the 
financial situation forced the L & N to suspend dividends from 1874 to 1877.21 
Due to his advanced age and the stress of keeping the L & N from financial ruin 
Newcomb fell ill in the midst of the financial crisis, and died on August 18, 1874. The L 
& N's vice president Thomas J. Martin took over, and Newcomb's son, Victor Newcomb 
took his father's seat on the board of directors. While the railroad stabilized its debt 
situation and remained solvent, Thomas Martin had to assure investors as to the financial 
health of the railroad. In one message to the investors, Martin wrote: 
Railroad companies live forever. It would be a short-sighted policy to look only 
to the profits of the next day or year. The managers of these great enterprises 
must look into the far future, and stockholders must be prepared to make 
temporary sacrifices in order to secure the permanent value of their property. 
There is every reason to believe that had this company not acted upon these 
principles at the proper time, had it remained a silent spectator ofthe great race 
that was going on around it between competing roads, it would not be reduced to 
a mere local road, of little value to its stockholders, and without the prospect of 
gaining a position of the leading roads in the country.22 
The message conveyed the new management principle of the railroad. Like other 
railroads throughout the United States, the L & N's directors envisioned the 
transformation of the railroad from a local or Louisville emphasis to a regional railroad 
serving the entire South. While still owned by Louisville interests, the stockholders and 
20 Klein, History o/the Louisville and Nashville Railroad, 132. 
21 Newcomb's son, Victor managed to arrange a deal on favorable terms, more so than what the company's 
board of directors expected. 
22 Annual Report of the President and Directors of the Louisville and Nashville Railroad Company 
(Louisville, KY.: J. P. Morton, 1875), 12. 
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directors of the L & N understood that the ultimate survival of the line depended upon the 
ability of the railroad to expand its reach new markets throughout the South.23 Also, 
Martin's message conveyed the sense that railroads were more than just companies. The 
construction and operation of a railroad system as extensive as the L & N was required 
tremendous human capital. Railroads employed thousands upon thousands of workers 
who did everything from construct and operate locomotives, to sweep the floors up at 
night. Unlike real estate and other company property, the important role workers played 
in keeping the L & N functioning and prospering during th3 1870s must be 
remembered.24 
Expansion for the Louisville and Nashville railroad resumed once prosperity 
returned. The careful, guided leadership of E. D. Standiford, who served as president of 
the L & N from 1875 until 1880, allowed the L & N to recover along with the national 
economy.25 Except for labor troubles in 1877-1878, the L & N once again began paying 
stock dividends, and the railroad continued a policy of slow expansion into Alabama, 
western Kentucky, and Tennessee.26 The most rapid expansion occurred between 1880 
and 1881, which made the L & N into the dominant regional railroad, and gave the 
company a rail line from Louisville to New Orleans. In March 1880 Victor Newcomb 
took over as president of the L & N. Newcomb worked for the L & N for several years 
23 Stover, The Railroads of the South, 115. 
24 For an examination of the nineteenth century railroad worker, see Walter Licht, Working for the 
Railroad: The Organization of Work in the Nineteenth Century (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 
1983). 
2S Kincaid A. Herr, The Louisville and Nashville Railroad, 1850-1964 (Louisville, KY.: L & N Public 
Relations Department, 1964), 58. 
26 Hines, Corporate History, 77-89. The L & N, like other railroads experienced a nationwide strike in 
1877. For a history of the strike, see Robert V. Bruce, 1877: Year of Violence (Chicago: Quadrangle 
Books, 1970); David O. Stowell, Streets, Railroads, and the Great Strike of 1877 (Chicago: University of 
Chicago Press, 1999): Philip S. Foner, The Great Labor Uprising of 1877 (New York: Monad Press, 1977); 
and Samuel Yellen, American Labor Struggles, 1877-1934 (New York: Monad Press, 1977). 
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prior to his ascension to the presidency.27 A financial genius, Victor Newcomb led the 
effort to restructure the L & N's debt and attracted British investment which kept the 
company afloat throughout the tough economic times of the early 1870s. 
The first major initiative Newcomb undertook when he became president ofthe L 
& N was to fully absorb the N. C. & St. L. into the L & N system.28 At that time, the N. 
C. & St. L. management was in protracted negotiations with the state of Georgia over a 
possible lease of the Western and Atlantic Railroad, which connected Atlanta with 
Chattanooga?9 The state-owned railroad, operated under a lease by several railroads, 
was a point of contention for the L & N and other southern railroads.30 The Central of 
Georgia Railroad feared further L & N expansion into Georgia and possible absorption. 
Through bargaining, the Central of Georgia stuck a deal whereas the L & N was to not 
absorb, but to retain ownership of the N.C. & st. L, in exchange for an uncontested bid 
for the lease of the Western and Atlantic. 31 
The period of 1880-1881 marked the final phase in the transition of the L & N 
from a small regional carrier to a major transportation force in the upper south. The 
leadership of Louisville-based interests and investors allowed the railroad to grow from a 
300 mile line to a 2,500 mile system by 1881.32 The transformation of the L & N into a 
regional railroad also highlighted the changes the railroad industry underwent nationally 
throughout the same period. Consolidation, absorption and merger became the important 
27 Klein, History of the Louisville and Nashville Railroad, 153. 
28 Annual Report of the President and Directors of the Louisville and Nashville Railroad Company 
(Louisville, KY.: J.P. Morton, 1874), 13. 
29 Stover, The Railroads of the South, 19. 
30 Hines, Corporate History, 89-93. 
31 The L & N operated the N. C. & St. L as a separate company until 1957. At that time, the Central of 
Georgia had been absorbed into the Southern Railway System, making the original deal null and void. In 
the late 1960s, when the lease of the Western and Atlantic was up for renewal, Southern attempted to gain 
the lease. 
32 Hines, Corporate History, 97-103. 
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industry objectives of the period. The result was the creation oflarge interstate railroad 
systems, which many rural Americans viewed as threatening, greedy, faceless 
corporations. 33 
The development of the L & N into a regional giant by 1881 also marked the end 
of Louisville-based control of the railroad. To that point, much of the railroad's 
existence, the general council of Louisville held a significant share of stock in the 
company.34 Starting in the late 1870s, rumors spread that the city was interested in 
ending its ownership of the L & N.35 The initial and subsequent stock purchases by the 
Louisville general council originally served the purpose to promote the railroad industry 
and commercial connections with Louisville. With the return of economic prosperity in 
the late 1870s, other railroads, including Collis P. Huntington's Chesapeake and Ohio 
Southwestern, began to construct lines to Louisville.36 Although it did not occur until 
1881, the L & N announced plans to purchase control of the Louisville, Cincinnati, and 
Lexington, a company that was the successor of the old Lexington and Ohio.37 The 
prospect of Louisville becoming a two or three railroad town appealed to the business 
community.38 Of equal importance, the Louisville general council wished to retire the 
debt which the city incurred to purchase L & N stock. In the summer of 1879, the 
Louisville general council announced that the city's plans to divest itself of its stock in 
33 John F. Stover, American Railroads (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1961),258. 
34 Between 1850 and 1864, the Louisville general council subscribed to over $4,000,000 worth ofL & N 
stock. 
35 Klein, History of the Louisville and Nashville Railroad, 132. 
36 Sarah R. Yates and Karen R. Gray, "Business Conflicts in the Mayoralty of Paul Booker Reid, 1885-
1887," Filson Club History Quarterly 61 (July 1987): 296. 
37 The Lexington and Ohio fell upon hard financial times in the l840s, and included a period of state 
ownership. The railroad, absorbed into the Louisville and Cincinnati, completed its line between Frankfort 
and Louisville in 1851. 
38 Yates and Gray, "Business Conflicts," 298. 
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the L & N.39 That same year, the L & N, through the constant news of profitability and 
territorial expansion, attracted serious attention from New York investors. Victor 
Newcomb, a familiar figure in the New York financial community, found suitable New 
York-based buyers for L & N stock.40 
New York investors waited two years for the city of Louisville to gain final 
legislative approval from the Kentucky General Assembly to sell the city's stock in the 
railroad. In those two years, opposition to selling the L & N to outside interests 
intensified in parts of the Louisville business community, and throughout the state.41 
Unable to outvote the New York interests, Louisville lost control of the board of directors 
by 1880, with Newcomb and one other member hailing from Louisville. The rest ofthe 
new board consisted of notable members of the New York financial community, 
including E. H. Green, T. W. Hayes, and W. M. Farrington.42 
In November 1880, Kentucky and Tennessee-based investors of the L & N filed 
suit against the railroad challenging the line's sale of stock to New York interests.43 
While the suit was dismissed, Newcomb stepped down and the board replaced him with 
E. H. Green as the road's new president. For the first time in its thirty years of existence, 
the president of the Louisville and Nashville Railroad was neither from Louisville nor 
Kentucky. Green's ascension into the presidency marked the final transformation ofthe 
L & N from a local business into an interstate corporation. 
Green passed the presidency of the L & N on to Christopher Columbus Baldwin 
in 1881. Charges of corruption, mismanagement, and the railroad becoming a 
39 Hines, Corporate History, 105. 
40 Klein, History o/the Louisville and Nashville Railroad, 158. 
41 Ibid., 164. 
42 Ibid., 154, E. H. Green was the husband of Hetty Green, the "Witch of Wall Street." 
43 Ibid., 168. 
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speculative venture permeated shareholder meetings for much of Baldwin's tenure as 
president. Baldwin further expanded of the L & N into Georgia, despite previous 
agreements with the Central of Georgia Railroad to not do SO.44 Baldwin used company 
expenditures in a scheme for the company to buy back stock and securities, inflate the 
stock price and dispose of the stock on the market. Investors in Kentucky and Tennessee 
became concerned in 1883 when the New York-based majority elected Jay Gould to the 
L & N board of directors.45 Gould, the infamous New York financier gained an unsavory 
reputation in the business and financial community as a person who wrecked companies 
and looted the treasury.46 By 1884, the L & N was nearly bankrupt. Baldwin represented 
the absentee management which allowed the railroad to suffer. Milton H. Smith, former 
general freight agent for the L & N and then a vice president, became concerned about 
the solvency of the railroad.47 In May of 1884, Baldwin resigned and a temporary 
president, James Rogers, took over for less than a month. In June, Milton H. Smith 
ascended to the presidency of the Louisville and Nashville Railroad. Smith, except for a 
five year hiatus in the 1890s, remained the president of the L & N until his death in 1922. 
Smith led the company through the difficult reorganization process, which 
included attempts to recover the securities and money that Baldwin took from the 
company treasury and placed in his own bank accounts.48 Soon after Smith's takeover, 
Jay Gould sold his interest in the L & N. August Belmont and Austin Corbin, two 
44 The Central of Georgia Railroad was unique in American railroad and economic history because the state 
of Georgia gave the company banking privileges as a way to finance railroad construction. 
45 Hines, Corporate History, 248. 
46 For a biography of Jay Gould, see Maury Klein, The Life and Legend of Jay Gould (Baltimore, MD.: 
Johns Hopkins University Press, 1986). 
47 Mary K. Tachau, "The Making of a Railroad President: Milton Hannibal Smith and the L & N," Filson 
Club History Quarterly 53 (April 1969), 129. 
48 In order to avoid a law suit, Baldwin sold his Newport, Rhode Island Estate and his art collection as 
partial reimbursement for the money he stole from the L & N treasury as president. 
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prominent New York investment bankers, gained control of the L & N's stock in 1886.49 
Belmont and Corbin, along with a cadre of investors from both New York and London, 
held the majority ofL & N stock for the rest of the company's corporate existence. 
While financial stability returned to the L& N as the company's ownership shifted 
from Kentucky to New York, important developments in the Kentucky political scene 
took place. As a result of the financial panic of 1873, and with the rise of agrarian 
politics in Kentucky, a period of public dissatisfaction with railroads began. The shift to 
agrarian policies, compounded by the dominance of the Bourbon wing of the Democratic 
Party, created a political and regulatory environment unfriendly to the L & N and other 
railroads in the state. 50 In power throughout the late nineteenth century, Bourbon 
Democrats ran Kentucky as if it were the 1850s, with little spending on public works and 
education. Service to the Confederacy, proved to be the litmus test for anyone aspiring to 
hold office in the era of Bourbon Democrats. Fearful of modernization, the Bourbons 
found allies in the small-scale farmers of central and western Kentucky where the roots of 
political agrarianism held sway throughout the 1870s and 1880s.51 
Countering the Bourbon Democrats was another wing of the Democratic Party. 
Called the New Departure Democrats, this wing of the party based its support in and 
around the city of Louisville. While early leaders of the New Departure were also former 
Confederates, they felt that service to the South during the Civil War was not a 
requirement in order to hold public office in Kentucky.52 But the New Departure wing 
understood that the future of Kentucky lay in industrialization and the expansion of 
49 Herr, The Louisville and Nashville Railroad, 61. 
50 Tapp and Klotter, Decades of Discord, 102. 
51 Ibid., 38; 59. 
52 Curry, Rail Routes South, 128. 
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improved transportation throughout the Commonwealth. Henry Watterson, the 
Louisville newspaper editor who coined the phrase "out Yankee the Yankee," summed 
up the goals ofthe New Departure Democrats.53 The Bourbons, not usually supportive of 
railroads, supported the Cincinnati Southern project as a means to diminish the economic 
and political influence of Louisville and the New Departure Democrats in Kentucky 
politics. 
The first strike against the railroad interests in the Kentucky legislature came in 
1878 with the passage of a bill which provided for the fair assessment of railroad 
property at a tax rate similar to that of other property. 54 Since 1829, many railroad 
projects chartered by the Kentucky legislature contained provisions allowing for generous 
tax relief on the property owned by railroads. By the 1870s as Louisville and small 
towns spent money on railroad stock funded through the issue of bonds, the floating debt 
situation became serious. 55 Allowing cities and towns to own railroad stock helped to 
promote the development of the railroad industry. By the 1870s, however, most railroads 
in Kentucky, especially the L & N, were profitable and no longer needed local and state 
government aid. As the owners and investors in railroads prospered and weathered the 
financial crisis of 1873, public opinion, especially in rural areas of Kentucky, turned 
against railroads. The passage of the 1878 taxation law only partially affected the 
railroads. Most railroad property was indeed grossly undervalued, which led lower taxes 
than had the property been assessed at the current market value. 56 This 1878 bill began to 
change the pro-railroad environment in Kentucky. Kentucky'S railroads started to feel 
53 Henry Watterson, Marse Henry: An Autobiography (New York: Beekman, 1974),48. 
54 Tapp and Klotter, Decades of Discord, 233-237. 
55 Ibid., 235. 
56 Hines, Corporate History, 89. 
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the legislative pressure coming from Frankfort. What followed was a continual back and 
forth of lobbying and campaigning by the railroads against further regulation, followed 
by the enactment of stricter and stricter regulation. The more heavy-handed the railroad 
lobby became in attempts to get their message of protectionism across, the more the 
railroads alienated the public. For every small legislative victory enjoyed by the L & N, 
another legislative defeat lurked around the comer. 57 
The first major regulatory blow to the railroad interests in Kentucky came with 
the passage of the Railroad Commission Act in 1880.58 This act created a four person 
commission with one representative each from the agrarian sector, the mercantile 
community, heavy industry and the railroad companies. The commissioners, appointed 
by the governor, were to prosecute violators ofthe state's railway and railway taxation 
laws, subpoena witnesses, and compile annual reports to the Governor and the 
legislature. 59 The creation of the Kentucky Railroad Commission marked the first step in 
tightening state regulation of the railroad industry. 60 
In 1882, the Kentucky legislature amended the Railroad Commission Act which 
empowered the commission limited rate-making power for intrastate freight and 
passenger rates. 61 The long-hated practice of railroads charging more for short haul 
freight versus long haul and interstate freight created an uproar within the agricultural 
57 The same pattern appeared to follow the L & N wherever the company tried to involve itself in politics. 
While not as dramatic, the L & N was involved in political lobbying in Alabama and Tennessee throughout 
the 1880s and 1890s. 
58 Tapp and Klotter, Decades of Discord, 258. 
59 James C. Klotter, William Goebel: The Politics of Wrath (Lexington: University Press of Kentucky, 
1977), 18. 
60 With no rate making power, the first Kentucky Railroad Commission was a "weak" commission. 
"Strong" commissions, like in Texas and Louisiana, had the power to set rates. For information on the 
development of railroad commissions, see Robert F. Himmelburg, ed. Antitrust and Regulation During 
World War I and the Republican Era, 1917-1932 (New York: Garland, 1994); David F. Prindle, Petroleum 
Politics and the Texas Railroad Commission (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1981); and John D. 
Hinkle, The Kentucky Railroad Commission (Frankfort, KY.: Legislative Research Commission, 1972). 
61 Ibid., 19. 
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and mercantile communities in Kentucky. Regardless of how much evidence the 
railroads produced to substantiate the necessity of charging more for hauling freight short 
distances, the critics of the industry never silenced their objections.62 In 1884, the L & 
N's new president, Milton H. Smith, deployed his political influence in order to counter 
the alliance of Bourbons and agrarians in Frankfort.63 
Smith, who acted as the L & N's chief freight agent during the company's fight 
against the chartering of the Cincinnati Southern in the late 1860s, learned the value of 
political lobbying. 64 While Louisville and the L & N failed to halt the project, the delay 
gave the railroad enough time to solidify its position throughout Tennessee and the 
middle South. Smith turned to the L & N's chief lobbyist, Basil W. Duke, to lobby the 
legislators in Frankfort for the L & N's cause. Using "liquor, food, and flattery," Duke 
managed to rally many to the L & N's cause.65 However, with growing discontent with 
the railroads, especially the L & N, Duke found himself fighting a loosing battle for 
influence in Frankfort. Throughout the 1890s, each time Duke and Smith applied more 
political pressure, an equally reactionary piece of anti-railroad legislation gained 
popularity. No longer viewed as a positive promoter of Kentucky commerce, and 
railroads, in particular the L & N, became a serious public enemy to the agrarian and 
Bourbon interests in Kentucky. 
With the dawning of the 1890s, the Kentucky Democratic Party pinned their 
hopes on a rising but unlikely politician, William Goebel. Goebel, the son of a German 
62 James Ely, Railroads and American Law (Lawrence: University of Kansas Press, 2001), 227. 
63 Tachau, "The Making of a Railroad President," 133. 
64 Mary K. Tachau, "Milton Hannibal Smith and the Louisville and Nashville Railroad" (M.A. thesis, 
University of Louisville, 1958),39. 
65 Klein, History of the Louisville and Nashville Railroad, 376. 
93 
immigrant, hailed from Kenton County in Northern Kentucky.66 After attending law 
school in Cincinnati, Goebel set up practice in Kenton County and began to build a 
system of political patronage. 67 Goebel acquired the nickname "the Kenton King" due to 
his growing influence in Kentucky politics.68 Not a powerful public speaker and 
somewhat aloof, Goebel galvanized public opposition against the L & N throughout the 
1890s. Vocalizing the frustration small farmers and merchants felt toward railroads, 
which they viewed as discriminatory and monopolistic, Goebel was able to tum public 
disgust for the L & N into a powerful electoral force. His anti-L & N platform propelled 
him to the office of governor, albeit briefly. 
William Goebel's rise into Kentucky political prominence began with his tenure 
in the Kentucky legislature. Goebel used his reputation as a successful, intelligent 
attorney to gain a seat in the state senate in 1887.69 Goebel crafted his anti-railroad 
platform to solidify a base with both the Bourbons and the rising agrarians of central and 
western Kentucky.70 
William Goebel's rise in Kentucky politics came with a legislative fight to make 
the railroad commission more powerful. The L & N lobby, headed by Basil W. Duke, 
almost succeeded in gaining enough votes to overturn several proposals which 
empowered the commission to issue judgments against railroads, and set intrastate freight 
and passenger rates.7! Using the extravagant lobbying by the L & N as a weapon against 
66 Klotter, William Goebel, 10-17. 
67 Klein, History o/the Louisville and Nashville Railroad, 349. 
68 Klotter, William Goebel, 23. 
69 Thomas H. Edison, ed., "Milton H. Smith Talks about the Goebel Affair," Register o/the Kentucky 
Historical Society 78 (September 1980): 330. 
70 Ibid., 332. 
71 Urey Woodson, The First New Dealer, William Goebel; His Origin, Ambitions, Achievements, His 
Assassination, Loss to the State and Nation; the Story of a Great Crime (Louisville, KY.: The Standard 
Press, 1939),23. 
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itself, Goebel persuaded enough senators to change their votes, defeating the measure. 72 
Even with Goebel's victory, the young politician sensed the power of Basil W. Duke and 
the railroad lobby. 73 Several times throughout the 1890s, Goebel called for commissions 
to investigate Duke and the L & N, as well as other railroads, in regard to their lobbying 
practices. Most legislators knew that several times during a legislative session, the L & 
N and other railroads held lavish receptions at the Capitol Hotel in downtown Frankfort. 74 
Until the passage of the Hepburn Act in 1906, which made the practice illegal, Duke and 
the other L & N lobbyists handed out passes for free transportation on L & N passenger 
trains.75 In addition to passes, Duke handed out free bourbon and other alcohol, money, 
lavish gifts, free trips, and other amenities to legislators and government officials.76 
Since the L & N's first major legislative battle against the Cincinnati Southern project, 
the railroad grew bolder in its attempts to win legislative support. Duke's universal 
appeal to all factions of Kentucky Democrats, however, could not eventually halt the tide 
of transition in Kentucky politics. 77 The railroad industry in Kentucky faced much 
opposition as the 1890s dawned. Proposals for a new constitution contained provisions to 
regulate the railroad industry in Kentucky, a position which grew popular with the public. 
Beginning in the 1870s, calls for a new state Constitution spread throughout 
Kentucky. The then current 1850 constitution was outdated and many provisions needed 
to be revised or thrown out. Even the hard line-Bourbons and agrarians felt that a new 
72 Klotter, Decades of Discord, 341. 
73 In the end, the Interstate Commerce Commission was the agency which investigated the lobbying 
r,ractices of the L & N. 
4 Woodson, The First New Dealer, 58. 
75 Ely, Railroads and American Law, 186; Railroads also used free passes as payment to keep local 
attorneys on retainer. For a discussion of the development of the legal profession in relation to railroads 
see; William G. Thomas, Lawyeringfor the Railroad, Business, Law, and Power in the New South (Baton 
Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1999). 
76 Woodson, 90. 
77 Tapp and Klotter, Decades of Discord, 414. 
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constitution needed to be authored, to suit their goal of limiting the incursion of industry 
into Kentucky.78 Meeting between 1890 and 1891, the convention drafted the new 
constitution, and presented Kentuckians a document that was almost impossible to amend 
or replace.79 As a powerful voice in the state Senate, Goebel used his political influence 
to insert key provisions in the new document which restricted the power of corporations 
in Kentucky. 
Noted Kentucky historian Thomas D. Clark wrote of the 1891 Constitution: 
One gets the impression that many ofthe delegates were, in fact, little Red Riding 
Hoods trudging alone and frightened through the perplexing forest of 
constitutional law, hoping that the big bad wolves of industrial and progressive 
changes were mere fragments of their badly agitated imagination, and that a rigid 
constitution with static provisions would serve to dispel these threatening 
wraths. 80 
The divide in the constitutional convention was the same divide which voted to limit the 
monopoly privilege of the L & N in 1872 by charting the Cincinnati-backed railroad. 
The resulting economic crisis of the early 1870s followed the financial problems of the L 
& N after ownership passed out of Kentucky hands and led to the creation of a strong 
anti-railroad lobby. Not only was the lobby anti-railroad but anti industry, anti-business, 
and as some would argue, anti- modem. 81 From their beliefs, the delegates crafted a 
lifeless document, which was difficult to amend, near impossible to replace, and served 
the agrarian interests in Kentucky. 
78 Ibid., 390. 
79 Until the 1970s, it was only possible to amend the Kentucky Constitution by passing an amendment in 
two separate sessions of the General Assembly, which met every two years. Then, only two amendments 
could be on the ballots at a time. The allowance of four amendments at a time, combined with annual 
legislative sessions has allowed the process to proceed faster. On the other hand, Article 256 of the 
Constitution makes the replacement of the constitution almost impossible with requirements such as 
multiple approvals of a convention by both the General Assembly and the voters. 
80 Quoted in William Green, "Constitutions," in The Kentucky Encyclopedia (Lexington: University Press 
of Kentucky, 1992),224. 
81 Green, "Constitutions." 
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The key provisions that affected railroads in the 1891 Kentucky Constitution fell 
into three areas. Overall, for the first time in a Kentucky constitution, the state regulated 
corporations outside of the original charters granted by the legislature. The constitution 
spelled out forty provisions which limited corporate activity within the Commonwealth. 
First, railroads could no longer rely on the state government for special, individual 
charters.82 The new constitution expressly forbade the issuance of special legislation 
designed specifically to help one company or one town.83 The constitutional ban on 
special legislation marked a shift in Kentucky toward general incorporation laws.84 
The second financial provision of the new Kentucky constitution limited public 
debt. The state, already limited by the previous 1850 constitution, could not borrow a 
significant amount of money if the debt could not be retired in a short period of time. 
Relative to the limitations on state indebtness, the new constitution limited the ability of 
local government to issue bonds or other securities in order to create or help a new 
corporation.85 The clause marked the first time a Kentucky constitution closely regulated 
local government. Part of the reasoning behind the provisions prohibiting local buying 
dealt with the city government of Louisville's purchase ofL & N stock. Louisville 
government accumulated nearly $4,000,000 in city debt over the years purchasing L & N 
stock. 86 While the city paid nearly all of it off with its initial stock sale in 1880-1881, the 
prospect of local governments being bankrupted by speculative business ventures 
frightened many, not just agrarians. 
82 Special or private legislation carried over as a common law tradition. The sheer size of corporate and 
industrial development in the nineteenth century made the enactment of general incorporation laws a 
necessity for most states. 
83 Kentucky Constitution (1891), sec 59. 
84 Following the 1892 ratification of the new constitution, the Kentucky legislature met for over a year to 
modify and rewrite Kentucky law in order to agree with the new governing document. 
85 Kentucky Constitution (1891), sec 141. 
86 Tapp and Klotter, Decades of Discord, 320-321. 
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The third major railroad-relate provision of the new Kentucky constitution dealt 
with the issue of the railroad commission.87 The original Kentucky railroad commission 
could have been dissolved by a simple majority vote of the legislature. Politicians like 
Goebel, who distrusted the lobbying and political power ofthe L & N and Basil W. 
Duke, decided to make the discontinuation of the railroad commission a moot point.88 
The new constitutional convention included a specific section creating a permanent 
railroad commission to hear evidence, try cases, issue opinions and reports and set 
intrastate freight rates. 89 The creation of a permanent Kentucky railroad commission 
created the exact regulatory nightmare railroads like the L & N wanted to avoid. The 
railroads argued that their "discriminatory" freight rates were actually based on the way 
in which railroads operated.90 To move a loaded freight car a longer distance actually 
cost the railroad less in terms of labor and savings of fuel. 91 The L & N had a greater 
demand for traffic heading south, rather than north. As a result, the L & N typically 
charged more to ship southbound freight, while freight heading north on the L & N 
commanded a lower rate due to less demand. 
State regulation, however, was not the only regulatory hurdle railroads such as the 
L & N faced. Starting in the 1880s, a series of reforms swept through the federal 
Congress starting with the Interstate Commerce Commission, ICC.92 The commission, 
later rechartered by Congress to specifically set freight rates, was an early attempt by the 
87 Kentucky Constitution (1891), sec 209. 
88 Rhea A. Taylor, "Bases of Conflict in the Kentucky Constitutional Convention of 1890-1891," Filson 
Club History Quarterly 46 (winter 1972): 27. 
89 Kentucky Constitution (1891), sec 217. 
90 Ely, Railroads and American Law, 81-83. 
91 Carson, Throttling the Railroads, 68. 
92 Ely, Railroads and American Law, 191. 
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federal government to regulate the growing railroad industry.93 Congress designed laws 
like the Hepburn Act of 1908 to limit the political influence of the railroads by limiting 
the issuance of free passes, gifts, free freight transportation and rebates to large shippers. 
As the agencies like the ICC began to reign in the railroad industry, intrastate 
transportation remained an unregulated area, left to the individual states. In Kentucky, a 
coalition of agrarian farmers and Bourbon Democrats used their political power to curb 
the state's largest individual company, the Louisville and Nashville Railroad Company. 
The anti-corporate and anti-railroad provisions of the 1891 constitution reflected the 
growing resentment toward railroads and corporations in general. In fifty three years, the 
Kentucky legislature transformed its public policies from ones encouraging business and 
railroad enterprise to policies strictly regUlating railroad entrepreneurship. 
Fearful of almost all forms of governmental regulation, Milton H. Smith, and 
Basil W. Duke, both arrived at the conclusion that the best way in which to halt further 
regulation was to be more aggressive in lobbying for the company and against politicians 
like William Goebel. Backed by the company's New York and European investors, the 
most notable example of the new heavy-handed approach to lobbying occurred during the 
still-controversial controversial 1899 gubernatorial election.94 The 1899 election marked 
a transition in the history of Kentucky politics. The Bourbon and New Departure wings 
of the party morphed into two new factions. The agrarians rose to prominence, with 
remnants of the New Departure and those opposed to the coining of free silver forming 
93 The creation of the ICC sparked a series of important Supreme Court Cases regarding the 
constitutionality of the agency. Crucial court decisions that dealt with the ICC were Interstate Commerce 
Commission v. Cincinnati, New Orleans and Texas Pacific Railway Company, 167 U.S. 479 (1897), 94; 
Interstate Commerce Commission v. Alabama Midland Railway Company, 168 U.S. 144 (1897); Interstate 
Commerce Commission v. Illinois Central Railroad Company, 225 U.S. 452 (1910) and Interstate 
Commerce Commission v. Louisville & Nashville Railroad Company, 73 F. 409 (Circuit Court, Middle 
District of Tennessee, 1896). 
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the opposition. Backing William Jennings Bryan in his failed bid for the presidency in 
1896, the agrarians made the governor's mansion their next goa1.95 
The Democrats met in Louisville on June 21, 1899 at the Music Hall to decide the 
party's nomination for governor.96 Goebel and his supporters took control of the 
convention and after multiple ballots and much inter-party struggle the convention 
selected William Goebel as the party's nomination for governor.97 At least once during 
the convention, outside agitators succeeded in disrupting the business of the convention 
which Goebel and his supporters blamed on agents and supporters of the L & N.98 
During the convention, Goebel picked up the powerful support of the state's largest 
newspaper, the Louisville Courier-Journal. Edited by Henry Watterson, a leader of the 
New Departure wing of the party, the newspaper expressed an anti-L & N sentiment in 
the years following the loss oflocal ownership ofthe railroad. Watterson's support 
created a coalition of agrarians, New Departure Democrats and Bourbons to defeat the 
Republican candidate.99 
Despite Goebel's new support, a dissident faction of the Democratic Party upset 
over Goebel's populist leanings, met separately after the Music Hall Convention and 
nominated former governor John Y. Brown. loo With two Democratic Party candidates in 
the election, the possibility of a split vote seemed possible. However, after the 
Republican victor in gaining Kentucky's electoral votes in the 1896 presidential election, 
Goebel and his supporters pushed through the Kentucky legislature a law which gave the 
95 Nicholas C. Burkel, "William Goebel and the Campaign for Railroad Regulation in Kentucky, 1888-
1890," Filson Club History Quarterly 48 (January 1974): 56-57. 
96 Klotter, William Goebel, 217. 
97 Klein, History of the Louisville and Nashville Railroad, 382. 
98 Ibid., 382-383. 
99 Ibid., 382. Watterson sent a letter to the L & N's board urging the company to stay out of the election. 
100 Tapp and Klotter, Decades of Discord, 423-425. 
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General Assembly the final say on any state wide election. The law, titled "The Goebel 
Election Law," limited the influence of Republicans in state elections. The utilization of 
the Democratic party-dominated legislature to decide election disputes acted as an 
insurance policy against any split vote. IOI 
Fueling the opposition to William Goebel was Milton H. Smith. Smith, as 
president ofthe L & N, helped restore financial health to the company after the brief but 
destructive period of ownership by Jay Gould and his partners. Smith, a native of New 
York, rose through the ranks of the L & N after working for the United States Military 
Railroads during the Civil War. 102 Smith's outlook on the industry and railroad-
governmental relations echoed his past. 
Unlike previous presidents of the L & N who had not been involved heavily in the 
railroad industry, Milton Smith came to the job with a deep understanding of the railroad 
industry. Smith began his career on the L & N working as a freight clerk. Thus, Smith, 
through his promotion and ascension to the company's presidency developed a leadership 
style that reflected his own experiences and beliefs. Smith's stubbornness and fear of 
governmental regulation fueled the L & N lobby and its efforts to stop the growing 
influence of William Goebel. Not a "robber baron" in the tradition sense, Smith 
foreshadowed the eventual regulator landscape in regard to railroads. l03 In 1898, Smith 
wrote: 
101 Woodson, The First New Dealer, 217. 
\02 Tachau, "Making of a Railroad President," 24. 
\03 Milton H. Smith and his family lived in a modest house on Fourth Street in Louisville. As president of 
the L & N he received $25,000 a year in salary, which never changed during his tenure. Smith felt that the 
amount was more than adequate compensation for a railroad president. Although the L & N constructed a 
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I think the people of this country, under the laws and decisions of the courts can 
do anything. They are going to confiscate the railroads; have the power and are 
going to do it; it is a matter of time. lo4 
Smith served as president of the L & N until his death in 1922, and during his tenure he 
witnessed the growing regulatory landscape the railroad industry faced. He viewed the 
growing power of state and federal commissions, political bodies in their own right, as 
destructive to the property rights of private companies. Of state and federal regulation, 
Smith wrote: 
People having a democratic government, with majority rule, create commissions 
and other forms of government with the power to confiscate-to, in one sense, 
destroy the value of the property of the other. lOS 
Smith felt that the use of state and federal regulation perverted democracy, and was 
misuse of government in order to destroy the private property and investments oflarge 
interstate corporations.106 It is from this regulatory outlook that William Goebel, after 
achieving the Democratic Party nomination for governor in 1899, appeared so threatening 
to Smith and the L & N's board of directors sitting in New York City. The young 
politician made a name for himself as a progressive reformer who was distrustful of 
railroad monopolies. 107 As a state senator, Goebel was a minor nuisance, whose 
influence could be overcome by simple lobbying of other senators. As governor, with a 
strong Democratic Party-dominated legislature behind him, Goebel posed a significant 
threat to the Kentucky interests of the L & N. As a result, when news of Goebel's 
nomination reached the L & N's president and officers, they sprang into action. To 
helped create the popular public perception that railroad executives were dishonest, always scheming, and 
not trustworthy. 
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protect the investors, Smith and the L & N board passed a resolution stating that the 
company was going to stay out of politics, a resolution that Smith and Duke had no 
intention of following. 108 This resolution followed an earlier move by the company to 
purchase two newspapers to serve as an unofficial company organ to defeat Goebel. 
The decision by the L & N and Milton Smith to actively, but unofficially oppose 
the election of William Goebel caused significant consequences for the company and the 
railroad industry. While a full recounting of the election is not needed, several key points 
need to be addressed. First, Goebel initially did not win the race. In fact, Republican 
William S. Taylor defeated Goebel by a count of 193,714 votes for Taylor and 191,331 
for Goebel. I09 The splinter candidacy of John Y. Brown siphoned off 12,040 votes from 
the Democratic Party, handing Taylor the victory. I 10 The state board of elections, created 
Goebel's election law, certified the election. However, Goebel's law gave the Kentucky 
legislature final authority to certify the governor's race, and Goebel began to apply 
significant political pressure on his Democratic allies. I II Goebel lost heavily in several 
Eastern Kentucky counties and in Louisville. The Democratic majority in the state 
legislature sought a way in which to throw out enough votes to hand Goebel the 
governorship.112 The intense campaigning of the L & N through its two newspapers only 
added fuel to the fire. During the election crisis in January 1900, the L & N began 
running special trains to Frankfort from several eastern Kentucky counties. I 13 Rumors 
spread that the L & N freely transported a mob of armed insurgents from the mountains 
108 Klein, History of the Louisville and Nashville Railroad, 384. 
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to impose the railroad's will on the election. I 14 In response, Governor Taylor, who had 
been inaugurated the previous December, called out the state militia. It was in this state 
of heightened tensions that the unthinkable happened. On the morning of January 30, 
1900, as Goebel walked to the Capitol building in Frankfort, he was shot by an unknown 
assassin. 115 The shots mortally wounded Goebel, and he died three days later. 
In response to the tragedy, Governor Taylor ordered the dismissal of the 
legislature but the Democrats did not leave. I 16 Instead, they threw out just enough votes 
to hand a dying William Goebel the governorship. I 17 Goebel's death forced both 
Democrats and Republicans to take pause, and rethink their strategy. Both sides, feeling 
that the prevention of a full scale civil uprising in Kentucky was too much to risk, 
reached a compromise that allowed Governor Taylor to step down, and for the Democrats 
to take control of the Governorship.ll8 
Because the L & N and Milton Smith took such a prominent role in campaigning 
against William Goebel, public outrage toward Smith and the L & N reached a high 
point. 119 Rumors circulated that Smith had ordered the assassination of Goebel to prevent 
the politician from becoming governor. 120 In response to the Goebel assassination, 
political sentiment against the L & N swelled. The state legislature passed a series of 
laws which further regulated the railroad industry through the railroad commission.121 
These measures included provisions prohibiting discriminatory freight rates and further 
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empowered the railroad commission to set freight and passenger rates until the bill's 
sunset provision came in 1920. 122 
The years from 1872 to 1900 reflected a transition for the Louisville and 
Nashville Railroad and the Commonwealth of Kentucky. As the railroad grew and 
became a powerful interstate corporation, the original goals for the railroad to serve 
primarily Louisville commercial interests passed. Instead, the company became an 
interstate railroad with a regional economic focus. The city of Louisville's decision to 
sell its stock to New York City investors marked a shift in the reins of control for the 
company. By the end of the nineteenth century, New York City interests headed by 
August Belmont and Austin Corbin effectively controlled the company and steered it to 
financial prosperity. 
Even with financial prosperity, the same period marked a transition in Kentucky 
politics. By the end of the century, agrarians and populists coalesced around an anti-
railroad platform. The Kentucky legislature, the same venue that in 1850 used its power 
to encourage business development by chartering the L & N, used its power to reign in 
the same company. Regulations such as the creation of the state railroad commission 
reflected similar developments throughout the United States. By the time of the 1899 
governor's race, the intense politicization of railroad affairs reached a breaking point. 
The ultimate use ofL & N political power to defeat a candidate for governor failed. 
Instead of keeping state regulation away, the L & N found itself regulated by the 
Commonwealth of Kentucky more than ever before. The political influence of the L & N 
diminished in Kentucky somewhat after this period. No longer would the company take 
122 The 1891 Kentucky Constitution stated that railroads could not charge discriminatory rates, however, 
legislation was required to empower the state to enforce this provision. 
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such an overt stance for a political candidate or toward an issue. Instead, the L & N's 
board of directors learned an important lesson. They learned that intense political 
lobbying was counterproductive in changing political opinion. Instead, the overt political 
lobbying by the L & N only highlighted the company's power and their power became a 
political liability. As the twentieth century progressed, the L & N and other railroads in 
the United States found themselves more and more regulated by the states and federal 
government. The 1900 Goebel affair in Kentucky was only the beginning. 
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CHAPTER FIVE 
MILTON H. SMITH'S LAST STAND: THE CHANGING FACE OF RAILROAD 
REGULATION IN KENTUCKY AND THE UNITED STATES, 1900 AND BEYOND. 
The assassination of William Goebel and the ensuing rush of public sympathy for 
the slain governor damaged the public image of the Louisville and Nashville Railroad. 
The extensive involvement by the L & N in the 1899 election highlighted to many the 
dangers of unbridled corporate involvement in the electoral process. Understanding 
politics as a means to an end, the L & N's president Milton H. Smith viewed increased 
regulation by state courts and state legislatures as an encroachment on traditional 
property rights. Railroads, Smith asserted, would be driven out of business by the state 
and federal government due to the growing regulatory landscape for the industry.! 
"The onward spirit of the age," as Justice George Robertson ofthe Kentucky 
Court of Appeals wrote in his landmark decision in Lexington and Ohio Rail Road 
Company v. Applegate and Others, gave way to an entirely different era.2 The Lexington 
and Ohio Railroad, L & 0, marked the coming of the railroad to Kentucky and the 
excitement the progress of expanded railroad development could bring to the 
Commonwealth. Originally supported enthusiastically, the L & 0 soon fell upon hard 
times, like most early American railroads. As railroad technology grew more reliable in 
1 Maury Klein, History of the Louisville and Nashville Railroad (New York: Macmillan, 1972),372-373. 
2 Lexington and Ohio Rail Road v. Applegate et al., 39 KY. 289 (1839). 
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the 1840s, the industry became profitable and the clamor for better transportation in 
Louisville led to the state's largest construction project.3 
The Louisville and Nashville Railroad grew out of the desire to create better 
commercial connections between Louisville and the South. In supporting the project, the 
Kentucky state legislature granted the L & N greater powers to condemn land, acquire 
raw materials, and secure financing for construction from a variety of sources, including 
local governments like the City of Louisville.4 Early backers of the L & N envisioned the 
new railroad as a line subservient to Louisville interests. Fraught with construction 
delays and a chronic lack of funds, the L & N did not reach Nashville until 1859. As a 
strategic asset, the L & N became the target of Confederate raiders during the Civil War 
in attempts to disrupt the crucial Union supply route from Louisville. Unlike its southern 
counterparts, the L & N did not fall victim to destruction like other major southern 
railroads during the war.5 
Surviving the Civil War intact, the L & N and its Louisville-based backers 
recognized the importance that continued and expanded trade with the South held for the 
city's commercial future. As a result, the L & N became only part of an extensive 
promotional campaign by the Louisville merchant community to project a pro-southern 
image.6 Part of the pro-southern image was to outmaneuver rival city Cincinnati in the 
quest to wholly dominate Louisville trade. The New Departure Democrats, a component 
3 Paul H. Coonter, "The Role of Railroads in United States Economic Growth," The Journal of Economic 
History 23 (December 1963): 481-482. 
4 "An Act to charter the Louisville and Nashville Railroad Company (March 5, 1850) Laws of Kentucky, 
Chapter 382. 
5 John F. Stover, The Railroads of the South, 1865-1900: A Study in Finance and Control (Chapel Hill: 
University of North Carolina Press, 1955), 178. 
6 Leonard P. Curry, Rail Routes South: Louisville's Fight for the Southern Market, 1865-1872 (Lexington: 
University of Kentucky Press, 1969), 10-17. 
7 Henry Watterson, Marse Henry: An Autobiography (New York: Beekman, 1974),78-82. 
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of Louisville's southern rebirth, envisioned an industrial and commercial future for 
Louisville. The optimism created by railroads like the L & N created a way, in 
Watterson's words, to "out Yankee the Yankee.,,7 Countering the New Departure wing, 
the Bourbons who represented the traditional power structure in the Commonwealth 
viewed helping Cincinnati as a way in which to stifle the New Departure and Louisville's 
power structure. The L & N and its chieflobbyist, Basil W. Duke, began a process of 
using the power of lobbying in order to attempt to coax the Kentucky legislature over to 
the railroad's camp. The continuation of lobbying and the application of increased 
political pressure continued. Like the economic law of diminishing returns, each new 
assault on the anti-railroad lobby by Duke and the L & N brought an equal vocal reaction 
in the Kentucky legislature, and a drop in favorable public opinion of the company. 
The rise in anti-railroad sentiment in Kentucky throughout the 1880s gave a rising 
Democratic politician, William Goebel, a platform to merge the two factions in the 
Kentucky Democratic Party.8 Even Henry Watterson, a former proponent of increased 
trade and commerce for Louisville, began to view the political activities of the L & N 
with increased disdain. With his appeals to Duke and Smith ignored, Watterson backed 
William Goebel for governor in 1899. Goebel ran on the pledge that he would further 
regulate Kentucky's railroad industry.9 Riding the tide of the surge of political 
agrarianism in Kentucky, Goebel became a popular candidate with farmers and small 
businessmen throughout rural Kentucky. 10 
8 James C. Klotter, William Goebel: The Politics of Wrath (Lexington: University Press of Kentucky, 
1977),97. 
9 Ibid., 123. 
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The heavy-handed approach by the L & N in the opposition of Goebel fueled the 
popular rumor that the L & N was responsible for Goebel's assassination on the steps of 
the Capitol in Frankfort. As a result, the L & N never again enjoyed the same level of 
political influence in Kentucky politics. Attempts to use lobbying and political pressure 
spread to Tennessee and Alabama where the railroad ended up with the same result, more 
state regulation. 
The period from 1829 to 1900 contained many changes in the way state and 
federal governments dealt with railroads. Prior to the l880s individual states regulated 
railroads. As railroads evolved from local companies to large, interstate corporations, the 
public clamor for federal intervention and regulation of the industry peaked. As a result 
of the increased calls for federal regulation, Congress created the Interstate Commerce 
Commission in 1886 to deal with the growing concerns about railroads. The ICC could 
only regulate interstate commerce, which still allowed states a crucial role in industry 
regulation. In Kentucky, the original railroad commission of the 1880s was a ''weak'' 
commission, whereas the backlash of the continued political involvement of the L & N 
created a "strong" railroad commission. I I In many ways the conduct of the railroads in 
Kentucky, notably the L & N, contributed to the political environment where the 
regulation of the industry became popular in the legal and political culture of the United 
States. Railroads, no longer granted special charters with extraordinary rights, served as 
a harbinger for the regulation of business by the state and federal governments. 
The L & N, through its expansion into Alabama during the 1870s, opened the 
state to economic development. The development, however, did not significantly solve 
the endemic problem of poverty in the state. Even more so than in Kentucky, the L & N 
11 Ibid., 258. 
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had a strong political presence in the Alabama state capital of Montgomery. 12 During the 
1880s, the L & N witnessed a series oflegislative maneuvers that created an all-out legal 
battle over freight and passenger rates. In 1881 Alabama created a "weak" railroad 
commission with little power to regulate railroads. 13 The commission rarely took any 
action, let alone push for lower rates from the L & N or any other railroad in the state. 
During the same period, Braxton Bragg Comer, an Anniston merchant, began to voice his 
opposition to the L & N's high freight and passenger rates. Comer believed that the L & 
N used high, discriminatory rates in Alabama to finance speCUlative business ventures 
elsewhere. I4 Comer's calls for a stronger Railroad Commission eventually gained 
momentum in the 1890s with the state legislature doing just that. The L & N, however, 
did not want to give up. They initiated a series of law suits against the state which sought 
to enjoin Alabama from enforcing any of the new laws. I5 The L & N felt that the laws 
which further empowered the commission represented an unconstitutional transfer of 
power from the legislative branch to a state agency. The L & N, through its attorneys, 
managed to keep the measures enjoined well into the twentieth century.I6 
In addition, in 1908 and 1909 the L & N loaned the state of Alabama nearly 
$249,000 to help cover state budget shortfalls. 17 While Milton Smith testified in 1916 
that he authorized the loans out of his sense of patriotism, few could deny that the loans 
put the state in an awkward position in relation to regulating railroads like the L & N. 
Meanwhile, Comer became a member of the Alabama Railroad Commission and used his 
12 James F. Doster, Railroads in Alabama PolitiCS, 1875-1914 (Tuscaloosa: University of Alabama Press, 
1957), 186. 
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post to gain electoral support against the L & N. In addition, Comer led the state's 
attempts in overturning the injunctions against creating a stronger railroad commission. 
When Comer and Alabama succeeded in 1910, Smith acquiesced, lowering freight and 
passenger rates in Alabama. IS Comer ran for governor, and the L & N's board of 
directors may have wished to avoid the embarrassment that occurred as a result of 
Goebel's assassination in Kentucky. While the outcome in Alabama was more favorable 
than in Kentucky, the L & N's actions, viewed as heavy-handed, helped create suspicion 
against the railroad as a result of its political and legal actions. Similar to Kentucky, the 
more the L & N became involved, the more it became regulated. 
The final and grandest example of the L & N's involvement in politics occurred 
from 1913 to 1917. The L & N attracted attention from the federal Congress in 
Washington during the Comer Affair. 19 The L & N expended large sums of money 
providing the state of Alabama with loans, and lobbying the legislature to support pro-
railroad measures. Questions about the L & N's role in politics finally reached a head in 
1913 when the Senate Commerce Committee started a brief investigation. The 
committee then requested that the Interstate Commerce Commission conduct an 
investigation the political expenditures of the L & N. Of particular interest, the ICC and 
the Senate was interested in how much the L & N spent on state political campaigns in 
Kentucky, Alabama, and Tennessee.2o After 1910, the L & N like other railroads became 
subject to closer scrutiny by the ICC.21 ICC examiners periodically examined every facet 
of a railroad's operations, from locomotive inspection practices, to how the railroad kept 
18 Ibid., 395. 
19 Ibid., 382-385. 
20 Ibid., 394. 
21 James Ely, Railroads and American Law (Lawrence: University of Kansas Press, 2001),172. 
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its books. Early ICC examinations into the L & N's accounting practices revealed no 
"smoking gun" insofar as a total of how much money Smith used to influence state 
political campaigns.22 As later discovered, Smith and the New York City-based board of 
directors secretly ordered that any political expenditure be hidden within the company 
books under such innocuous titles as "construction," and "advertising.'.23 As a result of 
this creative accounting, the ICC was never able to fully grasp how much the L & N 
spent on political campaigns. The attempted cover-up escalated with the Senate 
investigation. It was not until 1916 that the ICC gathered enough evidence to hold a 
hearing on the matter. Present at the hearing were Milton Smith, Basil W. Duke, August 
Belmont, and other officers and directors of the L & N. During the hearings, Smith 
spoke candidly about his feelings of government regulation. Believing that commissions 
such as the ICC were a perversion of democracy, Smith held a considerable amount of 
contempt toward the ICC and "strong" state railroad commissions, a reason behind his 
extensive involvement in politics.24 
The ICC asked Smith and other L & N executives a series of questions relating to 
political expenses by the railroad. One such question, "Is it the policy of the Louisville & 
Nashville Railroad Company to make political campaign contributions, if you know?" cut 
to the heart of the matter.25 When asked, however, about how much money the L & N 
hid in its treasury to spend on state political campaigns, Smith and other L & N 
executives refused to answer the questions.26 What ensued was a legal battle that reached 
22 Smith v. Interstate Commerce Commission, 345 U.S. 38 (1917). 
23 Klein, History o/the Louisville and Nashville Railroad, 386. 
24 Ibid., 371. 
25 Smith v. Interstate Commerce Commission, 345 US 38 (1917). 
26 "L & N Won't Open Books," New York Times, 14 December 1914, Sec 6A. 
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all the way to the United States Supreme Court. The case, Smith v. Interstate Commerce 
Commission, while not important in terms of United States legal history, was important in 
the history of the L & N's political involvement. Arguing that the ICC had no right 
inquire how a railroad such as the L & N spent is money, Smith sought to prevent the 
ICC from knowing how much the company held in its political slush fund. 27 However, 
Smith's arguments did not hold. Ruling against Smith and the L & N in a 9-0 decision, 
the court made quick work of the case. Justice Joseph McKenna in his majority opinion 
cited that Congress granted the ICC extensive investigative powers in 1910 and the court 
did not wish to attempt to circumscribe.28 Also, McKenna argued that any carrier 
engaged in interstate commerce had no such right to privacy and could not engage in 
secret activities, such as attempting to hide political expenditures.29 
Soon after the Supreme Court handed down its decision, Smith admitted that the 
L & N held over $250,000 in a secret account to use on political campaigns in Kentucky, 
Tennessee, and Alabama.30 Also, the ICC investigation uncovered that the L & N issued 
free passes to a majority of the Tennessee state legislature, a violation of the Hepburn 
Act.3l Overall, the L & N was just as involved in state politics as it had been before 
1900, albeit in a low-key manner. Smith v. Interstate Commerce Commission came at an 
important transition point in American railroad history. In 1917 the federal government 
seized all major United States railroads because of delays and gridlock in transporting 
27 Ibid. 
28 "Railroad Must Explain Political Expenses," New York Times, 6 November 1917, sec lA. 
29 Justice Joseph McKenna (1843-1926) served on the United States Supreme Court from 1898 to 1925. 
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supplies for the war effort. Operated under the United States Railroad Administration, 
the federal government did not relinquish control of the industry until 1921.32 While 
government ownership brought about important technical advances such as new, 
powerful standardized locomotive designs, the overall effect of government control 
produced long-lasting problems for the industry.33 Unionization of railroad workers 
continued since the 1870s to be a major issue in national labor relations. During the 
period ofUSRA operation, the federal government instituted an eight-hour workday and 
helped implement staffing policies that later hampered the industry by saddling railroads 
with high labor costs. The problem became a major one as railroads faced increased 
competition from automobile and bus traffic in the 1920s and 1930s. 
After the conclusion of the ICC investigation into the L & N, Milton Smith took a 
smaller role in the leadership of the L & N. Smith's age, compounded by the problems 
that leadership produced, created an opportune time for Smith to slip into partial 
retirement. Smith died in late 1921 at the age 84 after spending 30 years as head of the L 
& N.34 While controversial, Smith received much credit during and after his life for 
helping maintain the L & N's role as an industry leader, a role that the company slowly 
slipped from in the years following Smith's death. As for the L & N, the years of New 
York City-based ownership meant that more and more control passed to the board of 
directors after 1921.35 By then, the L & N became a subsidiary of the Seaboard Airline 
Railroad, another important southern railroad created by the acquisition and merger of 
32 Ely, Railroads and American Law, 243-244. 
33 For a study of the advanced locomotive designs developed under USRA control, see Eugene L. 
Huddleston, Uncle Sams' Locomotives: The USRA and the Nation's Railroads (Bloomington: Indiana 
University Press, 2002). 
34 Milton H. Smith, Railroad Head, Dies," New York Times, 23 February 1931, Sec 13A. 
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several smaller companies in the 1890s. While still maintaining some autonomy, the L & 
N, after 1921, was a far cry from the railroad that received much support in Louisville in 
1850. 
For Kentucky, the twentieth century brought the same issues of industrialization 
and modernization that dominated the late nineteenth century. The two old factions of 
the Democratic Party, the Bourbons and the New Departure melded into a single, 
dominant group. Supported by the political agrarians, the new Democratic Party adhered 
to the 1891 constitution which kept Kentucky more or less in the nineteenth century in 
terms of public projects, investments in education, and modernization. 
Justice George Robertson described railroads at "The parents of progressive 
improvement," meaning that the construction of railroads in Kentucky brought forth a 
series of new public policy issues. 36 As America's first big business, railroads helped 
transform the United States into an integrated, industrial economy. Each region and state 
approached railroad public policy in different ways. Kentucky, like other states, initially 
supported the industry by providing individual charters with transportation monopolies. 
That approach, however, was short-lived. Regulation replaced promotion and popular 
and political culture viewed railroads as a menace more than a benefit. That perception 
colors the popular images of the railroads to this day 
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